DOCUMENTATION | Exhibitions: 1648 - War and Peace in Europe | |
Essay Volumes > Tome I: Politics, Religion, Law and Society |
BJÖRN GÄFVERT MAPS AND WAR - THE SWEDISH EXPERIENCE DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR |
On July 2, 1631 the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus II wrote to one of his army commanders, Johan Banér, from Jerichow in northern Saxony: "all our land maps here come to an end". He wanted the most accomplished Swedish map maker of the day, Olof Hansson (Örnehufvud) sent to him to remedy the deficiency.
This incident not only illustrates the old saying "without maps no war" but it also shows the need to procure in advance maps of potential theatres of war. The King was by that time likely to be well stocked with maps of his base area in Pomerania but when he came further south in Germany he probably had to rely on a Swedish 1626 map by Bureus which ends north of Jerichow. As the war progressed the Swedish troops reached places much further away than could have been anticipated in 1631. Thus the need for maps and plans grew accordingly. The request of the Swedish king also points to a solution, to have his own cartographers produce new maps of those areas and places where the fortunes of war took his troops. Evidently, satisfactory solutions were found. Remarkably enough, no further complaints of this kind is registered during the remaining 17 years of the war.
This essay will deal with what today still remains of the maps and plans that the Swedes had access to during the Thirty Years War period. An attempt is made to deal with the whole of Germany, including Prussia, as well as neighbouring areas involved in the war such as Bohemia, Moravia and Austria. Only those maps found today in the Swedish National Archives and, primarily, in the Swedish Military Archives - a separate part of the National Archives - are included. Another limitation is that the essay almost entirely deals with hand drawn so called manuscript maps and plans and to a much lesser degree with printed maps and plans. This is, by the way, in line with an utterance by the Swedish king during the war that he distrusted printed maps and preferred hand drawn ones. Nor are Ordres de Bataille included. With these limitations, however, a substantial amount, some 400, maps and plans from the war period will be discussed.
The use of maps in the 17th century warfare differed substantially from today's. Whereas modern maps can be found at all level of commands in large numbers, at that time they were concentrated to the commanders and higher staffs. This was pointed out by, among others, the imperial general Montecuccoli. He also stressed the importance of being able to produce new maps as the war situation changed. Every army needed a number of skilled cartographers.
That led to, at least during the wars of the 17th century, that there existed a substantial number of different maps and plans in only one or a few copies each. It is also evident that they tended to be more useful for planning major developements such as larger movements, sieges or battles rather than details of them. The habit that an army marched and fought together rather than dispersed also made a concentration of the maps to the higher levels of command natural. Quite a few maps and plans of particular battles or sieges were made after the event in question for other purposes than planning, not least for propagandistic reasons. Very few plans are definitely made before the battle or siege.
A lot of information of importance for 17th century warfare could profitably be put on maps. A large part of the war consisted of movements. Information on roads, bridges, fords, rivers and of impediments such as mountains and swamps was essential. The all important feeding of men and horses necessitated knowledge of cities and villages, inns and roadhouses as well as possibilities for grazing and watering the animals. Of course the commander had to be able to approximate distances, both total and for daily portions. Political boundaries were naturally also important. For battles and in particular sieges other kinds of knowledge were valuable. The shape and strength of fortifications were a major factor in seige warfare. Knowledge of the topography around the besieged places was of interest as well.
Looking at the Swedish forces in the Thirty Years War, its supply of maps (of which we have only quite few contemporary evidences) could come from several sources. Maps could be brought from the home base, that is Sweden, made by Swedish cartographers or foreign. They could also come from the supplies of the allied forces. They could be bought on the market in Germany or by agents in the leading map producing country, Holland. Maps could be produced by own or allied carthographers and could be taken as booty from the enemy.
Many of the Swedish maps seem to have been made by Swedish cartographers. Although map making in Sweden by 1648 still had a rather short history it had in a few decades grown to respectable proportions. Very few traces remain of Swedish map making before 1600. In 1539 Olaus Magnus published his "Carta Marina". It was used in many famous cartographers= representation of Scandinavia although its lack of accuracy was well known.
Not until some 60 years later did the systematic investigation of Sweden start, albeit at a rather slow pace. The beginning was made with a Laponia map by Andreas Bureus in 1611 and, finally, in 1626, one of Scandinavia, "Orbis arctoi et accurate delineatio". This map meant a major step forward for Swedish carthography. It is surprisingly accurate and, indeed, came to be the basis for later maps of Sweden during the coming century. For areas outside Sweden Bureus could use existing maps. "Orbis arctoi" covered the area down to the 52nd parallel including where the first Swedish involvements in the Thirty Years War took place. It must have been used by the Swedish decision makers planning the campaign. It was considered exceptionally secret and only a few people had access to it. Today only seven complete copies exist. Although it represented a major step forward it was by no means much of an improvement concerning areas outside Sweden, as can be seen by a comparison with the 1613 Scandinavia map by the Dutch Adrian Veen.
By 1626 Andreas Bureus was not the only Swedish cartographer in action. His brother Johannes had produced some town plans and border maps. During the 1620-ies a whole group of cartographers connected with the Swedish army appeared. Most of them were foreigners educated abroad, such as the Germans Heinrich Thome, Georg von Schwengell and Georg Kräill von Bemebergh, who brought with them the knowledge of modern map making technique. The one among them that was to become most important was a Swede, Olof Hansson Svart (1600-1644), in 1635 ennobled as Örnehufvud. An important reason for the rise of cartography in these years was the needs of the warfare against Poland in the eastern Baltic region. A markedly improved organization of the Swedish state also lead to a need for more accurate maps, as well as a surge of new towns lead to many new plans. Much topographical information was systematically collected and utilized.
This growing activity found its organisational form in two major services, for the civilian mapping the Land Survey Board (Lantmäteriet) from 1628 and for the military work the Fortification (Fortifikationen), which was established in 1635. The mapping of interest for the Swedish warfare was mainly made by the Fortification, although, of course, the civilian surveying of Sweden proper also was a part of the intensive efforts to mobilize the Swedish domestic resources to meet the needs of the warfare in Central Europe.
By the late 1620-ies a domestic production of maps had started, both civilian and by the Swedish army. But Gustavus Adolphus also tried to buy modern maps in Amsterdam and in Germany.
The Swedish-Polish war meant that there appeared a crop of map makers, Swedish and foreign, with up to date knowledge of the subject, who had to learn to make maps under war conditions. They had to know how to use existing printed maps, how to find local maps, and how to reconnaitre areas where the population regarded them as enemies and deliberately misled them. All this training was to come to good use in the greater war in Germany.
This war was separate from the Thirty Years War, although it too had a religious side, Catholic vs Protestant. After the conquest of Riga in 1621 the Swedes expanded south-west, and from 1626 on the major area of warfare moved to Prussia, much closer to the area of the Thirty Years War. The Swedish-Polish war ended in 1629 with a decisive Swedish victory and an established control over most of the southeastern Baltic coast. A substantial number of town and fortress plans, of battle plans and also a few new topographical maps were the result of the war and the following occupation until 1635. Among the later, the map of the Vistula (Weichsel) area by Olof Hansson Svart (under the latinized name of Olaus Ioannis Gothus), Sveriges krig 1:66, was particularly important. Because of its accuracy it came to be the base map for further map makers. He also produced a few maps of smaller areas. One showed the western half of Danziger Niederung, Sveriges krig 1:69, another Marienburger Werder and adjacent parts of Danziger Niederung, Sveriges krig 1:70, a third the area Mewe-Marienwerder, Sveriges krig 1:73a, and one the Weichsel delta, Sveriges krig 1:68. Together they represent a rather intensive mapping of a relatively limited area. Another cartographer in Swedish service, Heinrich Thome, produced a beautiful map of the whole Prussian area from Polangen to Danzig. Finally, in the National Archives, can be found a large scale hand drawn map of the northern part of the Swedish occupation area from Memel to Pillau.
By 1629 the Swedish interest had more and more been drawn to the events in Germany. Already in 1628 the city of Stralsund had appealed for and got help from the Swedish king. In June 1630 he and the main Swedish army landed on German soil. From this moment until the peace of 1648 Swedish was one of the major participants of the war.
The extensive mapping that took place in the Swedish army during the period (1628) 1630 - 1648 will in the following be divided into two major parts, topographical maps on one side and town, fortress and battle plans et al on the other.
Among the topographical maps made by Swedes during the Thirty Years War, those by Olof Hansson Örnehufvud are the best known. Four different maps of the major German scene of war by him are known in addition to the five maps already mentioned. The four maps are:
1. No title but shows Brandenburg, the area Stettin-Landsberg-Grünberg-Dessau-Magdeburg-Helmstedt-Salzwedel-Wittstock-Strasburg. Not dated, but made between 1630 and 1634. Size: Height 58,5-63,6 cm, width 10,2 cm, scale app 1:350 000, hand drawn, bistre-brown ink, parchment. Swedish Military Archives, Sveriges krig 2:51.
2. No title, shows Meissen-Thuringia and Mansfeld. 1633. Size 72,8 x 91 cm, scale app 1:300 000, hand drawn, bistre-brown ink, paper. Swedish Military Archives, Sveriges krig 2:50.
3. Nova Totius Eichsfeldiae. Geographica Descripto (Eichsfeld). Not dated (1630-1634). Size 41 x 60,6 cm. Scale app. 1:140 000. Hand drawn, bistre-brown ink, paper on cloth. Swedish Military Archives, Sveriges krig 2:52.
4. Southern part of Bremen-Verden (area east of Weser from Bremen to Hameln). Not dated (1630-1634). Size 28,5 x 43,2 cm. Scale app. 1:30 000. Hand drawn, bistre-brown ink, paper. Swedish Military Archives, Sveriges krig 3:115.
Three of the maps became generally known fairly early. The Brandenburg map was published already in the Hondius atlas of 1638, the Meissen map first by Janssonius in 1649 and the Eichsfeld map first by C Blaeu in 1663. Only the Bremen-Verden map seems not to have been used by other cartographers.
Örnehufvud's map of Brandenburg replaced that of Mercator (1585, copied by Ortelius 1590) as the standard map of the area. The new map was immensely more detailed and gave a relatively good description of the local topography. It was in its turn not replaced until by the 1724 map by von Gundling.
It is not in detail known how Örnehufvud produced the Brandenburg map. Quite likely however, because of the many other duties he had to perform as a Quarter Master General during the permanent military operations, he had not had time for measurements or a regular survey. Instead he probably relied on oral descriptions, estimates of road lengths and some visual reconnaissance. Of all the possible information that could be useful for 17th century warfare the Brandenburg map contains a large amount of place names, water ways, bridges, heights in perspective and terrain descriptions. Also some roads are included. The other three maps contain basically the same information with some important exceptions. Only the Bremen-Verden map shows some roads and of the four maps only the Eichsfeld map includes some frontiers. The Eichsfeld and the Bremen-Verden map do not contain bridges.
When comparing the information given on these maps with what one would suppose to be important some surprising things stand out, namely the relative lack of frontiers, and, in particular, of roads. In order to plan movements of troups knowledge of roads should be crucial. How can this lack of information by explained? As far as frontiers are concerned they seem rarely to have been included at all on maps until later in the century. Why? Maybe because they were of a transient nature and the mapmaker wanted to make a map that would be correct for a long a time. But roads? That argument can hardly be applied to them, since many of them followed old tracks, in some cases even from the Roman time. There was no aversion in principle against drawing roads on maps. On the contrary, for maps of Sweden that were appearing at the time, it was especially ordered that roads should be included. Another possible explanation, lack of knowledge of the road system, also falls short. Quite a few printed itineraries with road descriptions existed around 1630. Many of them were the basis for road maps. Even tables of distances began to appear in the first half of the 17th century. Thus the comparatively extensive German road net was fairly well known by the Swedes. Neither can military secretness be an explanation, as the roads were well known anyway.
The apparent paradox of the missing roads has been explained thus. Firstly, roads were not as important as one might surmise. On even ground the troops could march whether there was a road or not. More important than the roads were bridges, fords and passes. With these on the map and also towns and villages the main directions of roads were given. Secondly, the old technique of map making still most in use was to find from an elevated point the directions to various other points. Distances were found by asking knowledgeable people about them. This made it difficult to map roads and also rivers. After the locations of bridges or fords were decided the river was often drawn in a very approximate manner.
The Örnehufvud maps are the most important but not the only maps made by the Swedes during the Thirty Years War. Probably in February 1631 a reconnaissance report and road map for the part of the Mecklenburg-Pomerian barrier between Ribnitz and Demmin was made, most likely on the instigation of Johan Banér. It is unusual since it is a very detailed, although primitive, mapping of a limited area. Other maps normally covered a much larger part and were consequently less detailed.
Probably from 1633-1634 is a well drawn map of the Lake Constance area by Paulus Morsheusser, Quarter Master General at Gustaf Horn's army. It is also a manuscript map and contains basically the same information as the Örnehufvud maps, although more roads, probably far from all, and no frontiers. The scale is appr. 1:150 000. Like on the Örnehufvud maps a great number of place names are given. The map is a good proof of what a large part of Central Europe the Swedish armies had operated in already a few years after the landing in northern Germany. From about 1633 dates a rather small printed map of the Weser river area and the adjacent areas of Lower Saxony and Westfalia, where, as the heading of the map, in German, says "nowadays most of the Swedish armies are 1633". Although it makes references to the Swedish troops it is not certain that it is of Swedish origin.
From the next ten years no more maps of this kind have been preserved. But towards the end of the war two more with some common caracteristics appeared. One was made in 1648 and showed the movements of the army led by Lennart Torstensson from February to November 1645. The map maker was Erik Dahlberg, who was to become a dominant name in Swedish fortfication and map making during the second half of the 17th century. It shows the marching route of the army through Bohemia, Austria and Moravia and also some rivers and terrain contours and the more important towns and fortresses of the area, including Swedish and Imperial garrisons and the various places where the Swedish headquarters stayed. Its scale is app. 1:750 000 and it is a manuscript map. From the same year, 1648, and covering partly the same subject is the Quarter Master General in Karl Gustav Wrangel's army, Georg Wilhelm Kleinstretl's printed map. It shows the German theatre of war from 1645 to 1648 and covers the marching route of the Swedish main army. It shows the river system in detail and many towns and fortresses, some hills etc but no roads except the ones actually followed, and gives no information on frontiers. The area covered is from the Harz mountains to Lake Constance and from Mainz to Vienna. The night quarters are also marked, from 1 Constance and from Mainz to Vienna. The night quarters are also marked, from 1 to 311. It is quite likely that Dahlberg's and Kleinstretl's maps have a common source but it has not been found.
Four more maps from this period preserved in the Military Archives may be mentioned. The first map, showing the frontier between Bohemia and Oberpfalz was made in 1629 by Tobias Schubharten. It is a large map, exceptionally beautiful, and shows in great detail the landscape near the frontier and a large number of frontier posts between "Flossenburgisch Schauer-Tanne" and "Peter Wiesse (Statt Waltmünchen)". It is however, certain that the map was not made by a Swede and it is possible that it was bought or, maybe even more probable, a booty of war. It may have been used as an operational map for the Swedish warfare in this region. The second map is drawn by Erik Dahlberg and contained in the same bound work (Handritade kartverk 21, Manuscript atlases 21) from 1648 as the map showing the movement of Swedish troops in 1645. This map covers the area from Travemünde on the Baltic to Boitzenburg on the Elbe. It shows the situation in 1638 of a projected Danish line of fortification aimed at sealing off Holstein from the southeast. It gives very few topographical details, only a few towns, lakes and rivers and the proposed line of fortifications. The third map, hand drawn and on parchment, covers the lower Oder river area, from the mouth to just south of Garz mainly the river itself and a few kilometers eastwards. The map was possibly made in connection with the protracted discussions about where the eastern border of Swedish Pomerania should be drawn. Thus it is probably made probably made around 1651 and an example of the execution of the peace of Westfalia. It may also be earlier, since it covers an area that the Swedes were intent upon keeping after the peace and thus can date from as early as 1630-1631. Its author is unknown. The map is rather detailed and shows many towns and villages, some roads and bridges, forests and lakes. In particular the various borders are very clearly marked out, this being the main purpose of the map. A somewhat similar map, manuscript and on parchment, shows the left bank of the lower Elbe down to a line Stade-Ösel. It is exceptionally beautifully made but has no date, no title, no description of its purpose and no name of the cartographer. Thus it cannot be proved that it belongs to the period of war, since it deals with an area that was to remain in Swedish hands after the peace. It gives information on some towns, topographical features and borders but most of all on roads and dykes. Windmills are also a prominent feature of the map.
The topographical maps that have been accounted for are mainly hand drawn. Of course the Swedes also had access to a number of printed maps, mainly of Dutch or German extraction. But since these were "../standard maps" of the age no further reference will be made to them.
Of the maps treated so far can in sum be said that they are relatively few in number, 20 in all. Most of them cover areas in Northern Germany, and most were made during the early years of the Swedish involvement, although some date from the very last years.
If the number of topographical maps made by the Swedes is rather limited the same thing cannot be said about two other kinds of maps, the town and fortress plans and the battle plans. In the Swedish Military Archives and National Archives a total of 379 such manuscript maps have been identified. Of these 118 are classified as battle plans, the rest as town and fortress plans. Of the total amount 15 are in the National Archives, the overwhelming majority, 96 per cent, thus in the Military Archives. The sum of 379 maps does not include printed maps or drawings at all. Nor are Ordres de Bataille, that is standardized drawings of the deployment of troops in, mostly, a battle included. They rarely show topographical details and are thus put aside. On the other hand, the maps from the Swedish warfare in Prussia are included. Of course many of the maps are not dated or otherwise easily proven to be from The Thirty Years War period. Some uncertainties remain but they do not influence the total number substantially, nor their distribution in time or space.
The cronological spread of these maps seems to coincide quite nicely with the levels of Swedish activity during the war. Apart from a few, ten to be exact, that were made 1618-1623 (and thus must have been acquired by the Swedes), the major amount starts to appear from 1626 onwards. This is almost entirely dependent on the Swedish activity in Prussia, although there were Swedish troops in the Stralsund area from 1628. The years 1626-1629 in sum account for 46 maps. The first years of the major Swedish involvement from 1630 on show large amounts of maps. The years 1630-1633 account in total for 82 maps, with 25 in 1632 as the maximum. Then the amount of maps tapers off. In the next four years period, 1634-1637, there are only 19, in the one thereafter, 1638-1641 still less, 16. This was also a period of generally lower Swedish activity in the war. The amount picks up again in the period 1642-1645 with 32 units. The last period, the three years from 1646 to 1648, shows a drastic increase to 67, actually a larger yearly average than the 1632-1635 period, with a clear peak in 1648 with 54 maps. This can be accounted for in two ways, one being a last flurry of activity before the peace, the second, and most important, being that it was in this year that Erik Dahlberg made a large number of plans, collected and combined in one single bound volume. However, quite a few of these were drawn in 1648 but show the situation some years earlier. They are then counted in the sum for those earlier years, mainly because they must be copies of now probably non existing earlier maps. For yearly figures see appendix 1.
The total spacial distribution can be studied in appendix 2 and in figure 6. Some areas of concentration stand out. The Prussian area with maps and plans from 1626 to 1635 is represented with no less than 71 maps. The warfare in this area was of course not strictly a part of the Thirty Years War but adjacent to the major theatre of war and influenced by the greater war. One of the reasons why so many maps of this area area were made or acquired is that the Swedes hoped to keep at least substantial parts, primarily the river mouths, built fortifications there and in other ways became interested in the area. However, in 1635, they had to leave it.
Another area with a substantial concentration of maps is Pomerania and adjacent parts. An area from Rostock to Kolberg reaching southward to Wittstock-Schwedt is represented on 73 maps and plans. The reason for this is probably both the length of the period of Swedish occupation, some parts from 1628 to 1648, most from 1630 or 1631 to 1648, and, as in the case of Prussia, Swedish hopes to be able to retain their base after the peace, a hope which was largely fulfilled.
No other areas show similar concentrations. A fairly small patch of land around Hameln accounts for 19 maps, of which nine of Hameln itself, in most cases maps from 1633, the time of the battle of Hameln. Another rather conspicuous concentration for a small area is the part of the Rhine from Rhees to Mörs with 14 maps. There are a few more notable concentrations, such as the lower Weser river, the Leipzig area and an area from Braunschweig south to Osterwieck, with nine maps each. Apart from these there is a remarkably even spread over the area between the Rhine and Oder rivers, with just a few on the west bank of the Rhine and some, mainly in the north, just east of the Oder. The Donau is not in the same way a limit to the south. A not insignificant number, ten maps, show the area from Konstanz to München south of the river.
The largest gaps in the distribution are two. One is between the Prussian theatre of war between the Swedes and the Poles and the Pomerania - Oder river area. Another is a large strip of land from Hanau eastwards over Bamberg east and south into Bohemia to Prag and Brünn.
The 379 town and fortress plans are divided among no less than 195 different towns and fortresses, an average of less than two per location. No single town is represented by more than eleven plans, the top position going to Stettin. These plans cover the whole period 1629 - 1648. Stettin, of course, was one of the major towns the Swedes hoped to, and also managed to, keep after the war. The second best represented town is Hameln with nine maps, almost all showing the occurances of 1633. Marienburg comes third with eight, than Elbing and Kolberg with seven each. Pillau, Stralsund and Wismar are represented on six plans while Danzig, Dirschau, Glogau, Landsberg (bei Posen), Montauer Spitze, Osnabrück, Rheinberg, Rostock and Wollin all are shown on five plans each. Most of these locations are in or near Prussia or Pomerania, the exceptions being Hameln, Osnabrück and Rheinberg.
The large amont of locations mapped shows both the extensive involvement of the Swedes in the Thirty Years war, the large area their troops covered and also the major importance of towns and fortresses in this war. Sieges were a commonplace occurance during the war but also construction works on existing fortifications and in not a few cases the foundation of new points of strength, particularily in areas the Swedes hoped to keep after the war. The town and fortress plans may thus have been acquired in advance of a projected siege, serving as instruments of planning but they may also be accounts of fortification works and thus made after the event in question. They have one thing in common, they are normally concentrated on showing the fortifications. What was inside the city walls was mostly of less interest to the planmaker but inevitably much important such information also slipped through.
Without a doubt many of these plans are among the earliest existing for quite a few important German towns. This is known to be true for example for such towns as Kassel, Magdeburg and Osnabrück but the list most likely does not end there. In sum they are a very valuable part of the early cartography of German towns.
A battle plan often contains much interesting information of a topographical nature. This category contains plans of sieges as well as battles fought in the country side. There seems to be no evident correlation between the importance of the battle and the number of plans preserved. The largest number of contemporary plans, six, depicts the seiges of and attack on Hameln in 1633. Four plans each commemorate the attack on Osnabrück, also in 1633, and the battle of Leipzig, also called the second battle of Breitenfeld, in 1642. Three plans each depict the occurances of Dessau in 1631, Mainz the same year, Nürnberg in 1632, Wittstock in 1636 and Glogau in 1642. In contrast such a major victory for the Swedes as the first battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 is shown only on one contemporary plan, the devastating defeat at Nördlingen in 1634 not at all and the all important battle of Lützen in 1632 on only two. The explanation seems to lie in a coincidence. The best represented sieges of Hameln and Osnabrück took place during the same campaign with the same commander and, presumably, the same cartographer. Either they were unusually active in mapping the occurances or their production happens to be extraordinarily well preserved.
No mention has so far been made of Swedish sea chart production during the war period. Sea charts were indeed important for the crucial Swedish transportations across the Baltic sea. Nevertheless, the Swedes used charts from the great Dutch production. The first Swedish made chart, by Johan Månsson, did not appear until 1644. It was based on Dutch charts and was a real improvement only on the parts of the Baltic sea that were of less interest to the Dutch, that is the Gulf of Bothnia. The next purely Swedish chart of the Baltic sea did not appear until almost 50 years later.
As a conclusion it can be said that Swedish cartography took a major step forward during the Thirty Years War. From the tentative beginnings before the war there evolved two organisations responsible for military and civilian mapping, a whole new generation of accomplished cartographers, especially militarian, appeared and the production increased drastically both in quality and in quantity. But the development is not only of interest to Sweden. The involvement in the war meant that the Swedish armies procured a large number of maps and plans over the war ravaged area. They are today an important part of what remains of Mid European cartography of these days. Many of them are among the earliest existing and many of them meant an increase of the geographical knowledge concerning their respective areas. The heritage of the Swedish intervention was also of cartographical importance. After the peace significant areas, the western part of Pomerania, Bremen-Verden and Wismar, came under Swedish control. In these areas the Swedish mapping activities continued on a rather intensive level all the time until the last part was ceded in 1815. In particular Swedish Pomerania, including the town of Stralsund, is represented on literally thousand of maps and plans from the Swedish period.