I. Precepts and Reality in the Foreign Policy of Richelieu and Mazarin

1. Richelieu's foreign policy since the beginning of his ministerial office (29 April 1624) during the "covert war" phase

Owing to its religious and civil wars during the second half of the sixteenth century, France was greatly hindered in terms of its foreign policy and power politics potential at that time. The French monarchy did not retake a more active roll on the stage of European foreign affairs until the reign of Henry IV (1589-1610).

Following Henry?s assassination on 14 May 1610, however, French domestic and foreign politics were characterized by a ?notorious instability at the ministerial level? [1] in the years preceding Richelieu?s appointment to the king?s council on 29 April 1624. A consistent foreign policy committed to clear, long-term objectives was obviously impossible during this difficult period and this first changed with Richelieu?s ministry. He in essence directed French foreign policy after 1624, but in no way decided it alone. King Louis XIII was and remained determined to protect his authority in every respect and Richelieu was constantly aware of this fundamental philosophy. The cardinal and the king did, however, agree on a central issue, i.e. on the strengthening of the crown?s authority and power and on defending it resolutely against attack. As a result of the specific character of the relationship between Richelieu and Louis XIII, the cardinal?s foreign policy cannot be understood as one in which his sole authorship can be substantiated in every case and in every detail. Therefore, when his foreign policy is discusssed in this text, the policy meant is one which was essentially shaped by the spirit of the first minister and which can be assigned to his area of responsibility.

Richelieu based his foreign policy program not only on considerations and principles of power politics. Rather it was also lastingly characterized by the continuous reference to general legal principles and the orientation along both confessional considerations as well as a theologically fundamented state ethos.

Richelieu?s policy vis-à-vis France?s Protestant allies appears at first glance to be an expression of a modern, non-confessional policy. Under closer analysis, it becomes clear, however, that this did not in any way entail the abandonment of confessionally founded guidelines based on principle. It is correct, though, that the paradigm change from the confessionalization of foreign policy, prevailing in Europe between 1570/80 and 1620/30, but certainly never total or absolute, ?toward [its, S.H.] leading function in the interests of state in [...] international relations? also manifests itself in Richelieu?s policy. [2]

Traditional considerations as well as legal questions likewise constituted determining factors in the cardinal?s foreign policy. An intense preoccupation with the problems surrounding intervention illustrates just how important the role of the law was in his thinking. In principle, he declared himself against the observation of such a right. ?It is not right,? he stated, ?that subjects maintain relationships to a foreign prince and expect their salvation, which can only be dependent on their rightful king, from him.? [3] From the context of this statement, it can clearly be seen that the cardinal found it generally valid. Nevertheless, Richelieu's quote needs to be more precisely defined, namely, the exercise of a right of intervention should generally be rejected only in those countries, in which the subjects are obligated to their prince, who is an absolute ruler, i.e. a sovereign according to the definition of sovereignty propagated by Jean Bodin (1529/1530-1596). ?Where, however, the power of the monarch was limited, Richelieu recognized [...] in agreement with the contract theory of government the subjects? right of resistance in the case of their rights being injured by their prince. And if the subjects call upon the aid of a foreign power in exercising this legitimate right of resistance, then, and only then, does a right of intervention exist.? [4]

For the first minister, the right of intervention was only applicable with the aforementioned restriction. This limitation allowed Richelieu?s use of it as a weapon in the struggle against Spain and the emperor, while denying this right to France?s enemies through the reference to France?s political organization as an absolute monarchy. In contrast, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were characterized by their aristocratic state structures, which thus granted the respective estates a right of resistance, according to the conviction of Richelieu, who based his ideas on the work of Jean Bodin and other French as well as German jurists and state theorists.

Also in his contemplations regarding territorial acquisition, Richelieu was guided by legal considerations and not solely from reasons of state, power politics, or the conventions of martial law, ius belli. Soon after the assumption of his ministerial duties, he directed French jurists to establish legal titles for French claims to territory and power and then verify their legitimacy. In doing this, they based their arguments on the fundamental law concerning the inalienability of the French royal desmesne, according to which, those regions which had been either expressly annexed or administered by royal officiers over the course of ten years counted as part of royal desmesne. The crown?s renunciation of such legal titles was consequently not only a question of political calculation. It was also - and primarily - a question of right and conscience. Richelieu recognized, however, that he could not stop with this position because the politician?s freedom of action would be hindered by it. He examined, therefore, the question of whether the renunciation of such legal titles could be disallowed under certain circumstances. In the course of this examination, he reached the following conclusion: ?One must understand the principle like this: it does not completely rescind the freedom to alienate royal rights, rather it limits it only in such cases where the measure seems absolutely necessary to save the state from complete ruin.? [5]

With his success increasing with the length of his ministry, Richelieu committed himself after 1624 to ending France?s articulated Catholic-Spanish policy, which it had pursued since 1610. For the cardinal, France?s relationship to Spain constituted the major problem for French foreign policy once again, as it had in the sixteenth century. This fundamental problem did not result only from bilateral tensions, which were again becoming increasingly virulent between neighboring France and Spain, but rather, much more from Spain?s political activities, which were viewed in France as a policy of isolation.

Richelieu was convinced that the creation of a universal monarchy under the House of Habsburg remained, as it always had been, the objective of Spanish policy. Such ambitions affected not only France, but now all of Christendom too. Thus, if the French king, whose monarchy was surrounded and directly threatened by the House of Habsburg, countered the ambitious hegemonic policy which Spain pursued under the pretext of being the defender of the Catholic faith, then the cardinal viewed this decision not only as an act of justifiable self-defense, but also - and primarily - as a measure to protect of all Christendom and as French engagement in the interests of general peace.

At first, the focal point of the confrontation between France and Spain lay in the area of northern Italy. Until the years 1629/1631, during which French foreign policy underwent a clear shift of emphasis toward the North, Richelieu?s concerned himself primarily with the weakening the Spanish position in Italy. With his Italian policy, the cardinal sought to achieve three goals: 1. the blocking of strategically important passes through the Alps against Habsburg-Spain (the Valtelline problem), 2. the opening and enduring defense of intervention points for France (Savoy, Saluzzo, Pinerolo, Susa), and 3. the reduction of Spanish influence in northern Italy (succession in Mantua and Montferrat).

France?s Italian policy cannot be examined isolatedly, however. It was and always remained a part of Richelieu?s complete foreign policy program directed against Spain and the entire House of Habsburg. Consequently, it had an often underestimated dimension, which already affected the emperor and the affairs of the Empire in those years. The latter resulted in the end also from the fact that apart from the Republic of Venice, the greater portion of northern Italy counted as ?Imperial Italy,? Reichsitalien.

As early as the phase of the ?hidden war,? Richelieu already attempted to realize these three main goals. He was served in this not only by limited, direct military intervention (Valtelline and the War of Mantuan Succession 1627-1631), but also by diplomatic activities, through which the erection of an alliance system in Italy against Spain and the entire House of Habsburg, of Italian leagues, should have been achieved. These short-lived and in general, relatively unsuccessful league-founding endeavors, which after their completion and with the inclusion of France?s opponents were lastly supposed to be reshaped into an instrument intended to maintain an enduring peace, should be categorized under Richelieu?s efforts to create a wide front against Spain.

The above-mentioned shift of emphasis in French foreign policy towards the North became apparent early in the course of the conflict surrounding the Mantuan succession. Richelieu found himself confronted with the fact that on this issue, the emperor supported Spanish claims and interests. The cardinal viewed Ferdinand II?s behavior as an alarming indication that the Spanish policy would be supported by the Austrian Habsburgs as well as by the Habsburg Emperor, who furthermore could then utilize the opportunities available to him within the Empire. Occurring against this backdrop, the shift of emphasis towards the North and in the Empire led to the conclusion of a treaty with Sweden in 1631 and was intensified following Gustavus Adolphus? massive intervention in the Empire. ?In fact, by doing this, a dangerous rival now arose suddenly, who advanced up to the Rhine and into Alsace instead of towards Vienna, but Richelieu confined himself during the following years to merely strengthening France?s position here (the protection treaty with the Electorate of Trier in 1632, which at any rate opened up garrisions for France as far as Ehrenbreitstein on the right side of the Rhine and up to Philipsburg; advancement in Lorraine; and the protection treaties with the Alsatian Estates), above all in accordance with the expansion of French intervention opportunities, which the famous avis from 13 May 1629 demanded in the form of a common front by land and sea against the combined Habsburgs above and beyond the already won northern Italian gateways.? [6]

2. The fundamental features of Richelieu's foreign policy from the time France entered the Thirty Years' War until the cardinal's death (1635-1642)

The fundamental convictions and guidelines behind Richelieu?s foreign policy expounded upon here also determined his political behavior and decisions in the phase of the ?open war,? which began with Louis XIII?s declaration of war on Spain on 19 May 1635. The immediate cause of the war, the arrest of the Elector of Trier on 26 March 1635, who was then under French protection, constituted, according to Louis? first minister, an act which affected not only Philip Christopher von Sötern and Louis XIII, but ?all Christian princes,? as stated in the French declaration of war. The clash between France and Spain thus was not a bilateral affair. ?Now, it would be an incomplete and one-sided description to consider Richelieu?s foreign policy a purely defensive reaction, which actually used political and military means within the broader framework of Christendom, but also limited itself to employing these means merely to ward off a threat. Richelieu wanted to achieve more than just the defense of Christendom. The main goal was a peace in Christendom. Actually, this had been the guiding principle of his foreign policy since the beginning of his occupation as the king?s responsible minister. It concerned the creation of ?une bonne paix de la chrétienté?.? [7]

With France?s open entry into the war, this central theme gained greater importance for Richelieu, because now France had to be even more interested in securing a comprehensive and lasting peace. In the cardinal?s opinion, central and, for this peace, constitutive elements had to be attained in order to realize this ambitious goal. The concept of the balance of power and the safeguarding of national pluralism were among these elements. The idea that a group of European countries with France at its center should form a counterbalance to the Habsburgs comprised an integral part of his contemplations constantly revolving around the problems of the maintainence of peace.

In addition to the universality and the maintenance of this sought-after peace, there existed yet another element which Richelieu deemed essential for its materialization, namely the role that France itself should play in this peace system. Certainly, a peace agreement lay in the interests of the French king, provided it ended the war and also removed the threat of new military conflicts for the immediate future. The cardinal sought, however, much more than this. The French king was not only supposed to act as arbiter and take on the central role of protector within the framework of the measures guaranteeing a ?secure peace,? but he was also supposed to function as the defender of all Christendom. In order for France to fulfill its role as a counterbalance to Habsburg-Spain and protector of Christendom, it had to be placed in the position to do that, as Richelieu emphasized time and again. He went one step further, though. Thus in 1629, he formulated the goal of his politcal strategy as: ?Rendre le Roi le plus puissant monarque du monde et le prince le plus estimé.? [8] The role to be assumed by the French king was therefore coupled with the goal of strengthening France?s position and that of its king within Christendom considerably. One must question, though, if the citation above does not include the admission that the Cardinal himself strived after the creation of a universal monarchy for France. Recently, Johannes Burkhardt firmly stated this point of view. [9] Such a far-reaching interpretation is, however, unnecessary. It is also not compatible with the logic of Richelieu?s concept, according to which, the French king attained his exalted position, his greatness, and his reputation as Christendom?s liberator and protector.

?It is reasonable to see nothing other than the concealment of a cold hegemonic policy in such arguments. I believe that one must be very careful here. There is no doubt that France?s and particularly the French king?s greatness occupied the foremost position in Richelieu?s political thinking. But when he also brought the interests of all Christendom into the equation, then this no longer remained just a matter of political calculation, but also became an essential component of his vision of political order. The question is absolutely legitimate as to whether the thought of a French candidacy for the emperorship was also connected to Richelieu?s understanding of Christendom and the ?most Christian? king?s role within it, as later sought by Mazarin. An explicit reference to such plans has not been found among Richelieu?s papers.? [10]

The cardinal?s struggle against the Spanish Habsburg universal monarchy cannot only be described as a questioning of the state system it dominated. Rather, his objective lay in breaking up this system and preventing its resurrection in the future. Richelieu intended to replace it with an European system of collective security, in which France would assume the leadership role. The basis and essential precondition of this security system was the plurality of - in principle - equal states. With closer examination of Richelieu?s concept, it can be concluded that his ideas amounted to a multi-polar state system, in which France was to function as the primary pole.

3. Between continuity and change: the major characteristics of Mazarin's foreign policy until the Peace of Westphalia



Mazarin?s domestic and foreign policy activities were characterized to a great extent by pragmatism. Being of Italian heritage, the chief minister, who Richelieu recommended to Louis XIII as his ?successor? and who was appointed to the king?s council four days after his predecessor?s death at the beginning of December 1642, occupied an even more difficult position inside the French monarchy than Richelieu, particularly since he had to struggle with tensions inside France from the very outset of his ministry.

If one recalls that Richelieu not only initiated Mazarin in his foreign policy concept, but that Mazarin had also worked intensively on the preparation of the peace directive from 1641, it is not surprising that he adopted his predecessor?s fundamental ideas in the main directive from 1643 almost verbatim. In spite of all the modifications in detailed matters resulting from the changing political conditions as well as the circumstances of the day, Mazarin retained the essential elements of Richelieu?s foreign policy. Mazarin?s reservation regarding both French territorial demands and the leadership role sought for France in the European state system was increasingly abandoned in the following period, as evidenced in the main directive and resulting from the specific political conditions at that time.



II. The Imperial Policy of Richelieu and Mazarin

1. Richelieu's imperial policy in the context of his foreign policy ideas and his political thought

In the session of the king?s council on 25 November 1624, Richelieu commented on the political situation inside the Empire and its consequent repercussions for French politics as follows: ?[...] les affaires d?Allemagne sont en tel état que si le roi les abandonne, la maison d?Autriche se rendra maîtresse de toute l?Allemagne et ainsi assiégera la France de tous côtés.? [11] The assessment expressed here of the relevance of the events in the empire for France determined Richelieu?s Imperial policy decisively until the end of his ministry. As this very early primary source illustrates, the cardinal oriented his policy concerning the emperor and the Empire fundamentally in keeping with his belief that the House of Habsburg, particularly under the influence of its Spanish branch, sought to create a universal monarchy. The Spanish Habsburgs always seemed interested in utilizing the Emperor and, with the help of his influential position within the Empire, Germany?s political power and resources in the interests of Casa de Austria?s ambitions. Thus, according to Richelieu?s conviction, French Imperial policy needed first and foremost to prevent the continuation of Habsburg-Spain?s ?abuse? of the emperor and the Empire in the pursuit of Spanish interests as its main goal.

If one takes into account this guiding principle of Richelieu?s Imperial policy as well as the course of political and military events, it can be established that at first, the Empire did not occupy the focal point of the cardinal?s foreign policy; this remained the case at least as long as the Spanish-French confrontation was concentrated in Italy. With the expansion and shift of the conflict toward the North and the fact that the cooperation between Vienna and Madrid had intensified in Richelieu?s opinion, French foreign policy inevitably had to devote even greater attention to the emperor and the Empire than before.

Richelieu believed that the emperor?s politics, particularly after his military and political successes at the end of the 1620s and beginning of the 1630s, aimed at ?making himself Germany?s master, turning the Empire into an absolute monarchy, and destroying the venerable laws of the Germanic Respublica.? [12] Therefore, it was intended that the Imperial Estates? free right of alliance, the right of election, the liberty of the Empire, and its character as an ?aristocracy? be resolutely defended and even expanded further in the well-understood interests of the Imperial Estates.



2. The important phases of Cardinal Richelieu's imperial policy

Upon closer examination, Richelieu?s Imperial policy can be divided into three phases: the first encompasses the years from the outset of his ministry (1624) until the end of 1630/beginning of 1631; the second ends around the turn of 1634/35; and the third stretches from the end of 1634/beginning of 1635 until the cardinal?s death on 4 December 1642.

During the first phase, French Imperial policy was closely tied to the Italian question. Richelieu recognized that Habsburg Spain could only maintain its position in Italy over the long term due to its connections to the Empire and the resources which could be mobilized north of the Alps. The cardinal?s Imperial policy thus aimed at weakening the Habsburgs? position within the Empire as much as possible. Logically, he therefore tried to employ all possible means in the Empire against the entire House of Habsburg during the phase of the ?hidden war?, which certainly came very close to open intervention in the war, but nevertheless avoided France?s direct entry into it.

Details cannot be examined here. It should, however, be emphasized that Richelieu was able to exploit the increasing tensions which manifested themselves in the relationship between the emperor and the Imperial Estates in his dealings with the various Estates. Richelieu offered the Estates, whose liberty he viewed as threatened, French support.

The turn in French foreign policy in regard to Imperial affairs, which resulted increasingly from the context of the Mantuan problem, suffered a clear defeat at the peace negotiations with the emperor at the Regensburg Electoral meeting. These negotiations finally led to the signing of the Peace of Regensburg on 13 October 1630. A general peace was declared and signed by French negotiators, even with their reference to the limitations of their authority beyond the settlement of the Italian conflict.

Richelieu criticized the peace for not limiting itself to settling the Mantuan succession and for providing an end to the conflicts with the Duke of Lorraine as well as the adjournment of the disputes surrounding Metz, Toul, and Verdun until a special conference. Above all, the cardinal took exception to the treaty?s universal character and its resulting consequences for French foreign policy. With the acceptance and execution of the treaty?s stipulations, the Imperial troops in northern Italy not only would have been freed up, in which case they could then have been employed against Sweden in the Empire, but any French support of Sweden would also have been made impossible. According to Richelieu, the acceptance of the Peace of Regensburg would have meant the continuation of the Imperial-Spanish domination of Christendom. The cardinal also made an effort particularly in those months to assemble a new alliance system against the House of Habsburg, which should have been realized with the Treaty of Bärwalde (23 January 1631) . Thanks to recent research, it has been shown in the meantime that shortly after its first, exceedingly negative reactions, the French side backed away from its extreme position. Further discussion of a sweeping refusal ceased. Instead, the French now expressed their willingness to implement the treaty articles concerning Italy as well as to continue negotiations after Imperial ministers had displayed indications of compromise. In Vienna, it was endeavored with some success to allay Richelieu?s fears that Ferdinand II could use the treaty to pressure France into more unacceptable concessions beyond those regarding northern Italy, and to force the French king into giving up his allies, thereby making him dependent on the emperor and the Empire. [13]

With the shift of emphasis in French foreign policy towards the North, the second stage of Richelieu?s Imperial policy commenced. During this phase, characterized heavily by the Swedish successes in the Empire, the extent and scope of French demands and claims with regard to the emperor increased temporarily. French foreign policy?s fixation on Spain diminished in importance at the same time. In contrast, the increasing alignment of French activities with the policies and interests of Sweden, which proved itself a dangerous opponent, can be observed. Only after the Battle of Nördlingen in the fall of 1634, in which the Imperial army decisively defeated the Swedes and their German allies, and after the Habsburgs had pushed their way deep into the French king?s territories in 1636, did Richelieu reduce French claims significantly. In those years, Ferdinand II, bolstered by his successes, made the far-reaching demands for restitution and remuneration. French envoys in the Empire, on the other hand, were now instructed to salvage what they could.

During this second phase of Imperial policy, Richelieu?s ?passage and protection? policy also took on particular importance for France?s eastern border. First practiced in northern Italy, it was developed in detail in the above-mentioned avis from 1629 and thus, belonged to that foreign policy program which the cardinal had drafted for the king following his victory over the Huguenots. As stated in this memorandum, France should erect assault gates and passages for itself at all borders in order to create intervention opportunities for the protection of the smaller Italian powers and the Imperial Estates. According to this foreign policy objective, ?military staging areas were moved from the eastern borders of the kingdom closer to the Empire, zones of influence were established, connection lines were advanced, whose frontmost points sought out bases, gateways, safe and secure crossings, and bridgeheads for themselves in Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Strasbourg, and Breisach. They constituted defensive measures triggered by military-strategic considerations, barriers against an Imperial offensive, barricades against a Swedish threat.? [14]

In the years 1631/32, Richelieu attempted to bring about a balance between the Catholic League and the Protestant Union in order to be in the position to mediate between the League and the Swedish king later. In 1634, he still continued these efforts. The failure of these endeavors and the growing threat to the area of Alsace-Lorraine, due at first to Sweden?s and then Spain?s advancement after the Battle of Nördlingen, resulted in heavier recourse to the ?passage and gateway? policy. As is discernable, however, from the political-military context and as recent studies have confirmed, Richelieu?s ?passage and gateway? policy did not aim at extensive territorial acquisition at that time. When the likelihood of an open break with Spain became increasingly apparent after Gustavus Adolphus? death in the Battle of Lützen (16 November 1632), the passage policy was expanded to the entire area between Ehrenbreitstein and Breisach as a protection policy.

Lastly though, this French policy could only be put into practice successfully with those Imperial Estates which risked becoming involved in a military conflict and for which the acceptance of French protection meant neutrality. After the devastating defeat of the Swedes and the League of Heilbronn in the Battle of Nördlingen, a completely new situation arose for France too. ?The area which could have been covered by defensive measures could not be held by a direct military action. France lost Mannheim, Philipsburg, and Speyer and soon also had to relinquish control of the flat land in Upper and Lower Alsace to the Imperial troops. France only retained its original positions, which then won new importance in French politics from a military point of view.? [15]

At the very latest, the second period of Richelieu?s Imperial policy ended with the French declaration of war on Spain (19 May 1635). In the third phase, which now began, the emperor and the Empire moved even further into the center of French foreign policy. For the cardinal, the stipulations of the Peace of Prague from 30 May 1635, which - closed to foreign powers - should have pacified the Empire and which constituted the pinnacle of Imperial power within the Empire, provided further evidence that Ferdinand II wanted to transform Germany into an absolute monarchy.

Until the present, French, English, and German historians have expressed the opinion that the emperor declared war on the French king in January 1636, who then in turn declared war on Ferdinand II in the following March and May respectively. It did not, however, come to formal declarations of war, to an open break between Louis XIII and Ferdinand II, as the most recent studies have revealed. Although the Imperial envoy did leave Paris in the week between 17 and 25 August 1635, Richelieu and Louis XIII wanted to avoid the consideration of this event as a declaration of war. Not until March did the emperor decide to leave the position in Paris vacant and to demand the departure of the French envoy, Charbonnières, from Vienna. Formal declarations of war were not issued however.

In a letter addressed to the emperor from 14 June 1636, Ferdinand III reminded his father that one year earlier, it had already been discussed whether one should ?end and abolish the commerce between the named crown and the Holy Empire, not any less than both the envoys located at the Imperial and French king?s courts partly demand and then, (should the named King of France, disregarding the Peace of Prague, in the event that he cannot bring himself to [uphold] this, declare himself for the enemies of the Empire) still [...] let him be publicized as an enemy of the Empire and all the less release a manifesto.? [16] In his answer, however, Ferdinand II asserted himself clearly against his son?s intentions. On 9 June 1636, the emperor explained that ?with all of these memories, various misgivings? had come to him because Louis XIII had never published a war manifesto against the emperor and the Empire, but rather ?also based the pretext of his arms almost solely on another thing, as the arrest of the Elector of Trier.? In spite of France?s attacks upon the Empire, he, the emperor, had not given up hope for peace and had not abandoned his endeavors to bring about a peace conference. [17] Thus, Ferdinand II rejected an open declaration of war. When his son asked him to publish a war manifesto against Louis XIII again in August 1636 and even went so far as to include a draft of a possible text with his letter, the emperor finally complied with his son?s request, but in such a way - and this fact is crucial - that the resulting document could not be regarded as a formal declaration of war. Ferdinand II made considerable changes to the draft he received, which clearly toned down the text. Not only the tone of his reply from 6 September 1636 [18], but also his changes to the draft attest to the fact that Ferdinand II remained concerned with not provoking Louis XIII and thereby avoiding the outbreak of an open war as much as possible. Additionally, the emperor refused either to sign the manifesto or let it be released in his name. His son, Ferdinand (III), acted as signatory instead. Also as a result of these events, an open break between Louis XIII and Ferdinand II did not occur.

If the military conflicts in the Empire, which France essentially left to its allies among the Imperial princes, were not at first terribly successful for Louis XIII, a turn in France?s favor came in 1638. The fact that the mercenary general Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, an ally of the French king, was able to snatch the key fortress of Breisach on the Upper Rhein from the Imperial troops on 17 December 1638 was of particular importance.

Until France?s open entry into the war, extensive territorial gain and border expansion were not Richelieu?s goal, but rather the military control of certain key positions, the acquisition of ?passages? and ?gateways.? Only after 1635, as the possibility of real peace negotiations began to appear, can the intention of actual annexation also be recognized. This is considered incontestable for Pinerolo and the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which had been under French protection for decades and were almost regarded as belonging to French royal desmesne. During the last years of Richelieu?s ministry, French ambitions in Lorraine also intensified. ?The occupation of the Rhine?s left bank from Coblenz to Basel with important bridgeheads on the right bank (Ehrenbreitstein, Breisach) was obviously determined at first by the desire to allow no other warring power to gain a foothold there, but after 1635, however, then increasingly by the intention to obtain security in order to prevent the conclusion of a peace in the Empire without the consideration of French interests.? [19]

As the peace directive of 1643 - which Richelieu had decisively influenced -, its earlier drafts, and the additional supplementary directive display in all clarity, the cardinal did not pursue a definite and inflexible program of territorial acquisition. He was primarily concerned with the realization of a politically strategic goal, namely the permanent opening of the borders surrounding France. With this, the prerequisites for permanent diplomatic as well as military intervention should have been fulfilled. In this way, the French king would have been put in the position to perform his peace-keeping function as the protector of Christendom.

This general concept provided Richelieu with a remarkable flexibility in handling the problems accompanying territorial gain. If he was still willing to discuss the question of Alsace and the fortress at Breisach in January 1642, he appeared resolute about their acquisition in November of that same year. It can also be seen, though, that he was willing to make some concessions to the Empire in the event that France achieved its territorial ambitions in the North (Flanders). Nevertheless, some indications point to the fact that he was really more inclined to create a favorable and strong strategic position for France on the Upper Rhine.

3. Mazarin's imperial policy from 1642 to 1643 in the context of France's internal tensions and crises

Only marginal differences at best can be ascertained between Mazarin?s concept of a French alliance policy, the founding of leagues of German and Italian princes against the House of Habsburg, the establishment of a system of collective security through the general guarantees of a yet-to-be-created universal peace, and Richelieu?s original ideas. They cannot, however, be put down to differences of opinion, but rather to altered circumstances.

Nevertheless, it soon turned out that Mazarin, even with all his agreement with his predecessor in questions of principle, including the area of Imperial policy, made broader-reaching territorial demands. It is only natural that a successor will not carry on the ideas of his predecessor unreservedly and it is likewise understandable that with increasing military success and the opponent?s consequent weariness, a state?s impulse toward expansion grows. Mazarin?s foreign policy was favored, in that on the same day as the Regent confirmed him as first minister, the Duke of Enghien achieved an overwhelming victory over the Spanish infantry at Rocroi (19 May 1643). The cardinal recognized the significance of the victory and effected that the French armies turn east toward the Imperial border. In the following period, the French opened up access to the Middle and Lower Rhine and finally, to southern Germany. In 1644, the Rhine?s left bank from Basel to Coblenz came under French control once again and for a longer period. ?Only the military position thus gained enabled France to assume the role it wished to play at the peace conference and then executed so splendidly.? [20]

Also considering the growing tensions inside France, Mazarin needed military and foreign policy successes. The opposition which had already grown virulent under Richelieu displayed its bitter disappointment in Mazarin?s confirmation as first minister. The potential for conflict resulting from this and also from increasing social and economic tensions finally erupted in the spring of 1648 in the so-called Fronde, one of the absolute monarchy?s most serious crises.

Under such circumstances, the decisive phases of the peace negotiations took place, the course of which cannot be elaborated on here. It soon became clear that Mazarin intended to show less consideration of the interests of the Imperial Estates than his predecessor and that he was resolved to sacrifice the sought-after reputation of the French king as the selfless protector of the Estates? liberty in order to obtain tangible advantages and acquire an influential position for France within the Empire. In his secret additional remarks to the directive for the French plenipotentiaries from 21 November 1643, Mazarin stuck to the demand he had formulated on 1 July, insisting on Upper and Lower Alsace, Breisach, and Philipsburg as satisfaction for the French king, in spite of the advice of even well-meaning Estates. The final cession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun to France was viewed as self-evident anyway. Mazarin recognized, even less than Richelieu, the contradiction which existed between the two main goals of France?s Imperial policy, namely on the one hand, the formation within the Estates of the strongest and most united opposition possible against the House of Habsburg and on the other hand, the establishment of a foothold in the Empire for France itself, the attainment of border improvements and bases, and even eventually, the possibility of France?s incorporation into the Estates.



III. The Peace of Westphalia - Successes and Failures of France?s Imperial Policy

The basis of an European system of collective security, which Richelieu formulated most concretely in the peace directives from February/March 1637 and 1641/42 and Mazarin then also accepted, and which intended to secure the still-to-be-concluded universal peace permanently, was finally realized, fragmentarily at best, in the peace treaty. [21] According to Richelieu?s draft, the universality characterizing every system of collective security should have been sought by including the greatest portion of Europe possible. This project also contained the remaining constitutive elements of this kind of security system: a prescribed sequence of measures against each violator of the peace, in which case peaceful mediation should be attempted first. If peaceful measures then failed, armed action undertaken by all members of the system against the transgressor of the peace was intended.

Because the concept of peace security was not realistic under the political conditions at that time, Mazarin had to lower his expectations in the course of the negotiations. Albeit fragmentarily, elements of this concept did find their way into the stipulations guaranteeing the Peace of Westphalia, although they remained imprecise in many points and thus open for interpretation. The inability to implement this security concept for Europe in its originally intended form resulted not only from the fact that the time was not yet ripe for such an idea, but also, and above all, from the oppositional stance of the emperor, Spain, and most of the Imperial Estates. Seen from the Imperial and Spanish points of view, it is understandable that both powers could hardly find anything positive in a plan whose realization would have further weakened their own and considerably strengthened France?s position in terms of power politics. Also among the Estates, though, which did not necessarily count among the Emperor?s supporters, this security concept did not meet with the hoped-for acceptance. With its realization and the demands referring to changes in the Imperial constitution, Reichsverfassung, Richelieu and Mazarin pursued among other things the goal of dissolving the Empire into a group of internationally independent states in order to limit the power of the House of Habsburg and the emperor permanently. A reduction of the emperor?s power also lay in the interests of most of the Imperial Estates. But because the majority of the middle-sized and smaller Estates depended on the Imperial Association, Reichsverband, and the Empire?s protection for securing their political existence and territorial intactness against the ambitions of the powerful Imperial princes, they did not want to see the Empire dissolved into independent states.

Despite all the selective cooperation, deep-seated mistrust of France prevailed among the majority of the Estates, excluding the small activist group around Hesse-Kassel. The negotiations over the French demands for satisfaction, in which the French side, thanks not lastly to the skillfulness of its diplomacy, essentially pushed through its territorial demands in regard to Alsace, Breisach, Philipsburg, and the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, also displayed this. And even in those points where the French side did have to make concessions at least on paper, for example in the question of securing the government of the Imperial cities in Alsace, Immediatstände, and in the three bishoprics, the French diplomats were able to insert passages into the text of the treaty with which French ambitions could be asserted in the future and under more auspicious conditions.

In regard to the Empire?s confessional problems, which should have been at least mitigated permanently at the peace conference, French policy found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, it was necessary to take into account the ?most Christian? king?s claim of being the protector of Christendom, i.e. of the Catholic church. For French Imperial policy, this meant seeing to it that the losses of the Catholics were at least limited to a bearable amount. On the other hand, France, who was allied with Sweden and several Protestant Estates on whom it depended for the realization of its goals and ambitions, could not risk losing the support of its allies due to all too inflexible behavior regarding the Protestants? demands.

Overall, French success in the area of confessional problems within the Empire remained quite limited. French diplomats occasionally made the, in their opinion, pronounced irresolution of the Imperial diplomats also responsible for this.



If the cardinal could not bring about a general peace and its permanent safeguarding through the realization of the concept of collective security, the separation of both lines of the House of Habsburg, which Richelieu had also pursued, did, however, succeed. The conclusion of a peace agreement with Spain failed owing to the unwillingness of Mazarin and Servien to compromise in the Lorraine question. Whether, though, the separation of both Habsburg lines achieved in Westphalia would last and could even be widened according to French desires, that would be revealed in the future.

FOOTNOTES