The uprising of the Bohemian estates of 1618 - 1620 has a number of historiographical dimensions. As a general historical period it stands at the start of the Thirty Years' War, the first war to involve all of Europe. [1] At the same time the uprising was an important stage in the development of the Habsburg monarchy and a turning point in the long efforts to integrate central Europe. [2] The outcome of the conflict was decisive for the re-Catholicization of wide areas of Central Europe, in this way also influencing the cultural development of the Bohemian and Austrian provinces. [3]

The uprising of the estates and in particular its defeat in the Battle of White Mountain on 8 November 1620 is closely tied to Czech national consciousness. Since the beginning of the 19th century each generation has written its version of the myth of the defeat and national rebirth of the Czech nation. [4] Historians, politicians and artists too tried to place the blame for the tragedy which took place on the White Mountain. Interpretation of the history of the nation was always subordinated to the ideologies of the time, leading to the "debate on the meaning of Czech national history". Today we can acknowledge with humility that a historian can merely approach the past, and that the unfathomable truth of history can only be guessed at between the hypotheses.

After their integration in the Habsburg monarchy in 1526 the provinces of the Bohemian crown increasingly became a crucial field for imperial and European politics. This applies in particular to the turn of the 17th century. The Habsburgs' striving to centralize soon led to conflict with the powerful Bohemian estates. The conflict was fanned by the fact that the parties belonged to different denominations, a situation similar to the one in the rest of religiously divided Europe. The oppositional nobility of Bohemia mostly belonged to the Reformed confessions; some to the local Hussite-Utraquist tradition, others to the new European Reformation currents. In their struggle for legal recognition of the "Confessio bohemica" the Bohemian estates exploited the weakness of the central power during the Habsburgs' fraternal feud, compelling emperor Rudolf II to grant them the Letter of Majesty guaranteeing religious liberties in 1609. [5] This charter also strengthened the political influence of the Protestant nobility. The Catholic estates loyal to the Habsburgs were in a minority, and subordinated themselves to the Protestant majority. This success drew the attention of the Protestant estates of the empire and the anti-Habsburg states of Europe to the political developments in the Bohemian provinces.

The struggle over the form of government - centralist monarchy or rule of the estates - culminated in the years 1618 - 1620.

The debate over the character of the monarchy was symptomatic for Europe at that time. The representative elite of the estates [6], defending the principle of separation of powers (Imperium mixtum) against the centralist tendencies of the ruling courts, naturally found resonance and allies abroad amongst the politically and denominationally like-minded. [7] Thus there was a close connection between on the one hand, the intensifying political-denominational conflict and the problem of Habsburg hegemony and on the other, the formation of a Protestant anti-Habsburg alliance.

To this extent the conflict in the Bohemian provinces was paradigmatic, because the concept of religious and estate freedom was a protection against centralism - an interest which united the local and foreign representative elite. The central European great power of the Habsburgs was indeed an alliance of states each with its own administrative systems, not united by permanent economic, political or cultural interests. But still the representative elite of the estates appeared in the role of the protector of Bohemian independence.

The Bohemian opposition was led by a group of aristocrats from both higher estates, the lords and the knights. The free cities were politically weak, still enduring the consequences of the defeat of the first great uprising of the estates against the House of Habsburg in 1547 in which they had played a leading role. [8] For this reason they played a subordinate role in 1618, and the politically active aristocracy demanded above all financial support and ideological propaganda from them.

In 1611 Emperor Matthias ascended to the Bohemian throne. In the following years there was great tension between the Protestant estates on the one side and the emperor and his loyal nobles on the other. Political agitation and the alliance policies of the Bohemian estates intensified the conflict. The connections to the co-religionists in the diplomatic circles around Frederick V of the Palatinate, the leader of the Protestant Union, were especially intensive. [9] They played an important role in the mobilization of forces in Bohemia and the development of the conflict, while the other great Protestant power, Saxony, took the position of observer, giving primary consideration to safeguarding its own interests.

At the beginning of his reign Emperor Matthias was forced to respect the internal political leadership of the Bohemian estates, having attained the throne with their assistance. But he did not lose sight of the goal of Habsburg politics - a firm central power as the basis for universalistic expansion in the empire and in Europe. Matthias' political strategy was aimed at the weak point of the Bohemian estates system, the asymmetrical nature of the provinces of the Bohemian crown. The estates of central Bohemia often assumed political decision-making powers and occupied national and even royal offices. This naturally aroused the resentment and sometimes even open resistance of the estates politicians in the "incorporated provinces of the Bohemian crown", especially in Moravia.

So the emperor, in whom the Protestant estates had placed great hope, first played a waiting game. He did not give an opinion on the declaration in which the estates demanded the right to raise troops to defend the denominational and estate liberties attested by Emperor Rudolf. At the same time the estates pressed for ratification of the treaties (confederation) which Matthias had concluded with the estates in the provinces of the Bohemian crown, in Hungary and in Austria in order to gain their support in his struggle for the throne.

In this situation the confederation was no longer useful for Matthias, but rather a political threat. For this reason he even abstained from raising taxes which required the approval of the provincial diets, which would have required the signing of the estates' declaration in return. In 1612 Matthias even moved his court from Prague to Vienna to avoid the constant pressure of the Bohemian estates. But in 1614 he urgently needed the taxes from the Bohemian provinces to pay his troops who were fighting against the Turkish invasion. So at the meeting of the diet in eské Bud jovice where approval was given for taxation, he promised to call a general assembly of all provinces of the Bohemian crown within a year, to discuss the unfulfilled demands of the estates. This general assembly, intended amongst other things as a demonstration of the strength and unity of the Protestant majority in the estates in the confederated provinces under Habsburg rule, was a debacle. [10] The representatives of the Hungarian estates did not come at all; the Austrians were present, but were annoyed about Prague's estates policies, as were the Moravians and Silesians. Karl d.Ä. von erotin, the leader of the Moravian estates, accused the Bohemian estates of trying to misuse the representatives of the "incorporated provinces" for their political goals, "they want to be the head and we should be the tail of the kingdom". These disagreements allowed the court in Vienna to breathe a sigh of relief, as the general assembly neither ratified the confederation of estates nor renewed the treaties with the imperial princes. This demonstration of inability to take a valid decision was a poor prelude to the upcoming negotiations on the succession with the childless Matthias. The internal disagreements were one reason why, at the meeting in 1617, the Bohemian estates recognized Ferdinand of Styria as Matthias' successor without a proper election. A decision they later attempted to reverse with constitutional arguments.

The failure of the general assembly of 1615 strengthened the separatist tendencies in the Protestant estates, which now began independently to carry out secret negotiations with potential allies abroad. The contacts between the Union and the Protestant estates of Bohemia were particularly intensive - they counted on mutual assistance in the case of a conflict with the emperor. On the other hand Karl von erotin condemned the politics of the Union as the temptation of one "who invites another to gamble, but also wants to borrow the money for gambling from him".

The waiting game of the Moravian estates was not least due to the high degree of autonomy of the estates. In contrast to Bohemia (Letter of Majesty), denominational pluracy was not governed by law in Moravia. Some historians speak of "supra-denominational Christianity" of the political elite in Moravia. [11]

In Bohemia the tension was sharpened by provocative steps taken by the imperial governors, initiated by a radical-Catholic group of Habsburg loyalists within the royal council. That Rudolf's Letter of Majesty of 1609 gave full freedom of religion to the population of Bohemia, but left out land ownership rights was just what the opponents of the Protestant estates needed. This meant that, for example, when the Lutherans built a church in Broumov, the abbot of the Benedictine monastery had legal authority to close it. The Catholic authority acted similarly against the Lutheran church in Hrob (Klostergrab, northern Bohemia). [12] The Broumov case was a matter of discussion at the assembly of the Protestant estates in autumn 1611. The legal dispute reached its peak in 1617/18, when the governor ordered the Lutherans in Broumov to hand over the church key to the monastery, and had some petitioners who had lodged complaints with the emperor arrested and locked up.

At the March meeting of the Protestant estates in 1618 the participants expressed their displeasure over the actions of the governors. At the same time it became clear that the opposition was increasingly losing ground. Many of the representatives of the urban estates (at their head the representatives of Prague) did not even attend the meeting. So the radical group, with Count Heinrich Matthias von Thurn at its head, had no alternative but to postpone the meeting to 21 March 1618. The visible weakness of the Protestant opposition led the imperial side to increase the pressure. The emperor banned the postponed meeting and ordered Count Thurn to Vienna. The March meeting took place in this tense atmosphere. A group of conspirators decided to carry out a demonstrative act which would force all participants in the meeting to hold together, even if their path could no longer be followed by peaceful means. This was the defenstration (throwing out of the window) of the two speakers of the "Spanish side" in the governing council, Counts Jaroslav Bo ita von Martinic and Wilhelm Slavata von Chlum und Košumberk, from a window of the royal chancellery in Prague Castle on 23 May 1618. The council of defensors of Rudolf's Letter of Majesty was immediately converted into a directorate. This thirty-strong government of the estates mobilized the Bohemian troops and prepared an "Apologia" to justify the actions and the decision of the Bohemians to European public opinion. [13] The council of defensors was prudent enough to avoid entering into open conflict with the emperor. It placed the blame for the events in Prague with the royal governors - they had violated denominational liberties guaranteed by Rudolf's Letter of Majesty.

A month after starting work the new government of the estates, composed of "directors, administrators and district officials", elected Wenzel Wilhelm von Roupov as its leader.

But it was unable to decide to dissolve the existing royal administrative offices and governorial functions. All the same, much of what they did had a revolutionary character, although von Roupov and his companions made great and incessant efforts, verbally and in writing, to emphasize the legality of their actions and deny that they were revolutionaries.

Unsure how to continue after the radical start, the government resorted to improvisation and missed the chance of internal political consolidation. Reliable support from abroad also failed to materialize. Fortunately the Viennese court was completely unprepared for the events in Prague, and the declarations and actions of the government of the estates left the imperial council unable to agree on how to proceed against the "rebels".

The military operations of both sides in 1618 proceeded in step with the political developments. [14] Immediately after the founding of the directorate Heinrich Matthias Graf von Thurn was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the estates. But it appears that they did not have great faith in Thurn's ability, because the directorate soon started negotiations with Friedrich von Hohenlohe, a member of the Viennese council of war and supporter of the policies of the Palatinate Elector Prince Frederick, over his participation in the army leadership. In view of the doubts about Thurn's leadership qualities von Hohenlohe demanded to be in supreme command of the army of the estates. But when in the summer the first serious fighting began, von Hohenlohe and Thurn shared the supreme command, agreeing to alternate every two months. Alongside these two commanders-in-chief Ernst Graf von Mansfeld also commanded an infantry regiment of about 2000 soldiers, which had been sent by Frederick of the Palatinate to support Bohemia. (In Bohemia it was however not known that this regiment, originally intended for fighting in the Netherlands, was paid by Charles Emmanuel, duke of Savoy. The Catholic duke, tempted by the promises of the Palatinate Court Counsellor Christian von Anhalt, hoped to gain the Bohemian crown from this venture. He also had ambitions of gaining the imperial crown.) So three army commanders were active in Bohemia in autumn 1618, unable to agree on a uniform strategy. Apart the course of the fighting, local sources, Hohenlohe's letters, and documents in the state archives of Saxony demonstrate the defensive attitude and indecisiveness of the directorate. [15] Protestant Saxony assured both sides of its neutrality and offered its services as a peace mediator. Prince Elector Johann Georg gained political advantage from the negotiations, becoming indispensable for both parties. So the government of the estates and its envoy Hohenlohe unexpectedly became unsuccessful petitioners for military assistance.

The correspondence between the Viennese court and the directorate between May and September 1618 shows that Matthias, taken unawares by the events in Prague, was not ready to defeat the uprising through quick military intervention. [16] The influence of the archduke's chancellor Melchior Klesl, bishop of Vienna, who favoured negotiation with the Bohemian "rebels", is clearly noticeable. On the other side the party of the "accepted" Bohemian king Ferdinand urged for military measures.

It was clear that a military test of strength would impinge on a complicated web of interests of the European great powers. The papal nuncio and also the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, Iñigo de Oñate, argued for a radical solution. But the Madrid court viewed the dispute between the emperor and the Protestant estates in Bohemia as a local conflict which did not require intervention. Because the end of the twelve-year ceasefire with the Netherlands was nearing, Madrid wanted to avoid spreading its troops across all of Europe.

In order to accelerate the decision for war against the Bohemian estates Ferdinand, who had already recruited troops, had Cardinal Klesl arrested in Vienna on 20 July 1618 and deported to the Tyrol. This deprived the moderate forces in the court of their most important spokesman. Peaceful resolution of the conflict had become impossible. Ferdinand's army under the command of the Walloon count Henri Duval Dampierre, and additional troops withdrawn from the border with the Venetian Republic were ready. At the beginning of August a second army was raised using funds collected by the papal nuncio and Archduke Albrecht, stadtholder of the Netherlands. Under the supreme command of Karl Bonaventura Buquoy it was estimated to comprise 6000 infantry and 6000 cavalry troops.

At the start of June 1618 the army of the estates under the supreme command of Count Thurn advanced to southern Bohemia, intending to take the towns of eský Krumlov and eské Bud jovice. They had not joined the uprising, but lay on strategically important routes from where the enemy was expected to attack. Dampierre and his troops, hoping to exploit the rebels' weaknesses, had penetrated southern Bohemia at the start of August, but was repulsed before Nový Hrady and forced to retreat hastily to Austria.

The neutrality of Moravia proved to be a much greater problem for the rebels. The assembly of the estates of this most important secondary province of the Bohemian crown, in Olomouc in June 1618 confirmed Karl von erotin's attitude: neutrality as the only salvation from the catastrophe the Protestant estates had flung themselves into. [17] At their August meeting in Brno the Moravian politicians went still further, allowing imperial troops free passage to Bohemia. The position of the directorate was made still more difficult by the representatives of the Silesian estates who failed to make a clear declaration of support for the uprising at their diet in June 1618.

So in September 1618 Thurn and Hohenlohe were forced to face the enemy, advancing through Moravia to Bohemia with about 14,000 men, on their own. They only had four infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments, which would have meant 16,000 men.

But recruitment was poor and the regiments were incomplete. On 10 September near áslav Thurn managed to stop Buquoy's troops which had been advancing towards central Bohemia, and after a week forced them to retreat. The situation of the army of the estates improved in the following weeks, as Count Mansfeld's army arrived. It had been provided to the Protestant Union by Charles Emmanuel, duke of Savoy. At the start of October reinforcements arrived from Silesia, where the initially hesitant estates had decided to support the Bohemian rebels. In autumn the army moved its camp to southern Bohemia, while Buquoy set up winter quarters in eský Krumlov, eské Bud jovice and surroundings during the ceasefire.

A change in the policy of the directorate can be detected after the September assembly of the Bohemian estates. Although official declarations continued to stress that the struggle for political and denominational rights was not directed against the emperor, the Saxon envoy in Prague, Grüntal, signalised to Dresden that the time for negotiations was over and that peace did not come into question for the Habsburgs. [18]

The fact that the "accepted" king was in the enemy camp, stimulated the thoughts of some Protestant politicians about changing the royal dynasty. Frederick V of the Palatinate received increasing attention as a possible alternative to Ferdinand. However, the Palatinate party in the directorate with president von Roupov at its head was forced to keep the subject of the negotiations secret from the pro-settlement side and the pro-Saxon party; these negotiations had been carried on by the Heidelberg envoy Achaz von Dohna in Prague since November 1618. But von Roupov made no secret of his opinion that it was time to break with the Habsburg monarchy and despite the promise to Ferdinand, to offer the throne to a different candidate after the death of the sick emperor Matthias. The negotiations between Heidelberg and Prague continued after Matthias' death, but did not meet with the approval of the imperial princes which the estates politicians could have hoped for or expected.

In view of the unclear balance of forces the Heidelberg cabinet took a wait-and-see approach. [19] At the start of April Dohna surprised the president of the directorate with the news that Charles Emmanuel of Savoy was financing Mansfeld's troops and was also willing to equip new troops, and asked for the Bohemian crown for the duke - doubtless a red herring. Dohna must have known that Savoy's candidature would provoke resistance from the Bohemian estates. After all Charles Emmanuel was a Catholic. Mansfeld on the other hand let it be known that the duke already owed his troops pay for at least half a year, that he, Mansfeld had no means to pay the debts, and would have difficulty obtaining a loan. Not until the end of September did Dohna end the game of Charles Emmanuel's candidature, and left Prague with an offer from part of the directorate for Frederick to accept the Bohemian crown.

This time the Heidelberg court was forced to give a direct answer. Before agreeing Frederick wanted to discuss this important step with his father-in-law, the English king James I, and asked for a postponement of the election. The counsellors in Heidelberg advised against calling a general assembly of the provinces of the Bohemian crown to relieve Ferdinand of the thrown and elect a new king, because the election of the emperor was to take place soon and Ferdinand was the obvious favourite.

The Palatinate party in the directorate, however, did not want to wait until after the election of the emperor, because victory for Ferdinand would have dashed all hopes of dethronement. So, ignoring the promised postponement, on 27 August 1619, one day before the election of the emperor they elected Frederick of the Palatinate as king of Bohemia.

Frederick hastened to tell the other imperial princes that the Bohemian conflict had nothing to do with imperial matters and that the balance of power in the empire was not affected. The princes of the Catholic League with Maximilian of Bavaria at their head were disapproving. They rightly feared that the local conflict could blow up into a long European war if Frederick accepted the Bohemian offer after the dethroning of Ferdinand. [20] This would have meant a clear loss of power for the Austrian Habsburgs and a threat to their imperial crown, which the Spanish line of the House of Habsburg would hardly have accepted. The exclusion of the Bohemia question from imperial matters in the Palatinate argumentation was a harbinger of catastrophe for the government of the estates in Prague. It offered the Protestant Union and the other allies an excuse not to join in the Bohemian conflict and to restrict their promise of protection to the Palatinate home provinces in the empire.

In the assembly of the Protestant Union, which Frederick called in the unbelievably short time of 14 days after election as king in Prague it was clear that the imperial princes and free cities were unwilling to let themselves be drawn into the conflict between the Bohemian estates and the Habsburgs. [21] The kings of England and Denmark were also unwilling to join the conflict directly. The Saxon elector viewed the election of his rival in the Protestant camp to king of Bohemia as a defeat for himself. Frederick tried unsuccessfully to convince him that he had given the political conflict the character of a religious war. Only the Calvinist Moritz von Oranien, stadtholder of the Netherlands expressed his happiness. And the Dutch estates-general assured the Heidelberg court the Bohemian war would be decisive for "our mutual interest", especially for the Palatinate which bordered on Bohemia, and promised assistance. [22]

The international political constellations had changed considerably since the Dutch uprising against Spain. Then the rebels had been supported by England and anti-Habsburg France.

But now France was on the side of the House of Habsburg, and his worries about the European balance of forces led the English king to ask his son-in-law Frederick to give the Habsburg Ferdinand his vote in the election of emperor, and not to involve himself in the Bohemian matters.

In the meantime the estates politicians in Prague formed an alliance with Gabriel (Gábor) Bethlen, Count of Transylvania, Ferdinand's rival for the Hungarian crown. But the neighbours in the east, the Turkish Sublime Porte, turned out to be unreliable. Alliance negotiations dragged on into the summer of 1620 without any results worth mentioning, and did not end until three weeks after the Battle of White Mountain. The situation was made more explosive by the Austrian Protestant estates declaring their opposition to Ferdinand and offering Frederick of the Palatinate the government of a Bohemian-Austrian confederation.

When the Palatinate Elector came to power in Bohemia royal power had been greatly weakened. In July 1619, before he was elected king, the assembly of the estates had decided to constitute the provinces of the Bohemian crown as a federation of independent "estate states". [23] The inherited inequality between the Bohemian estates and the estates of the "incorporated provinces" was to be done away with. The provinces of the Bohemian crown, Lower and Upper Austria and even Hungary were to be represented as equals in a general assembly, the highest legislative organ. The power of the king was reduced to the executive, he was to be accountable to the general assembly for his acts. These plans for a Bohemian confederation grew into a vision of unification of all Protestant estates in central Europe. Rather than some king, the shared constitution was to be the guarantor of political rights. This vision should not be misunderstood as a portent of social and political revolution. Instead it meant separation of powers (Imperium mixtum) as it had always been established in the ideas of the estates. The only new features were the establishment of freedom of religion for the Protestant estates and their precedence over the Catholics. This concept of a federal constitution was the reason for the Moravian estates to abandon their neutrality at the beginning of August 1619 and join the Bohemian uprising.

However this vision could not make up for Bohemia's increasing international isolation. And it could not compensate for loss of strength - the economy was in tatters and resentment of the war was growing amongst the population. The failure of the Bohemian-Palatinate strategy was made clear by the January 1620 assembly of the Protestant Union. [24] When the Dutch estates saw how the Protestant alliance was crumbling they accepted the Spanish offer to extend the ceasefire, and made their continued support for the Bohemian cause dependent on England's stance. There the spread of the Bohemian conflict was watched with great concern - the English court did not want to be part of an anti-Spanish alliance. James I was still counting on Frederick V withdrawing from Prague - the condition for support in the defence of the Palatinate.

The French king's mediation also aimed in this direction. On 3 July 1620 in Ulm a non-aggression pact for the Palatinate was concluded between the Catholic League and the Protestant Union. The treaty did not however exclude the League supporting the emperor in the war in Bohemia. Bohemia was not a member of the Union and the Union therefore was not obliged to protect it. The defeat of the Bohemian estates was thus foreseeable, and came to pass on 8 November 1620 in the Battle of White Mountain. [25] After 1620 the war which had begun with the House of Habsburg's struggle for Bohemia grew into a European conflict, which thirty years later still had not been resolved.

FOOTNOTES