From the mid fifteenth century on, the papacy had successfully modernised the Papal States and the entire papal territory had been made dependent on the central authority of Rome. [1] Despite the evident moral and religious weaknesses of the popes as well as their excessive nepotism, Rome and the Papal Court had - during the age of the Italian Renaissance - again become a vibrant centre of political, spiritual, and cultural influence for all of Europe. Until the dissolution of the Papal States in the nineteenth century, the popes had exercised their authority in two respects: as elected sovereigns of a middle-sized Italian state and as the Supreme Head of western Christendom. These two functions were frequently conflicted. As secular rulers, the popes were drawn into European state politics. However, as the representative of Christ and "Padre comune" they had to remain impartial in order to preserve or mediate the peace. Rule over the Italian peninsula did not only ensure supremacy in the Mediterranean area - it was also the key to European hegemony.

For sixty-six years, France and Habsburg Spain had fought for this objective. In 1559, Spanish supremacy was confirmed by the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. France, for the time being, was forced out of Italian politics. With the death of Henry II, the country was disrupted for thirty years by confessional conflict, civil war, and struggle over the crown. The popes were deeply embroiled in the long-lasting political and military conflict between the two contending powers. By shifting their alliances, they attempted to preserve the independence of the Papal States and to prevent foreign predominance in Italy. Securing "libertà" and the "pace d'Italia" became their most important political concern. However, this policy could only succeed if a balance of power could be maintained between France and Habsburg Spain. When, in 1559, the Spanish king Philipp II prevailed against France, the papacy as well as the Italian states became dependent on Spain. Thus, only candidates acceptable to Spanish rule could be proclaimed pope by the conclave.

Conditions didn't change until Henry IV, after quelling domestic strife, reintroduced the Kingdom of France as a leading power in the game of European politics. After much hesitation, Pope Clement VIII (Ippolito Aldobrandini, 1592-1605) [2] granted Henry absolution and recognised him as king. This step limited the power of Spain and the papacy regained its political flexibility. Henceforth, Clement VIII attempted to act as "Padre comune" and impartial mediator of a reconciliation between France and Spain. With unity restored, Christendom - which now consisted only of those parts of Europe which remained Catholic - was to prove its strength in the struggle against the Turks, who since 1593 had begun to menace the German Empire again. Thanks to papal mediation, the peace negotiations had been successfully concluded with the signing of the treaties of Vervin (May 2, 1598) and Lyon (January 17, 1601). However, the formation of an anti-Turkish league akin to that developed by Pope Pius V (Michele Ghislieri, 1566-1572) failed. Nevertheless, the pope came to help the emperor with his own contingent of troops. The early death of Henry IV in 1610 and the interregnum of Maria de Medici delayed France's ascent as a leading European power. Only after Cardinal Richelieu joined the government of Louis XIII in 1624, did the political constellation gradually change to the advantage of France. This was chiefly due to a continual weakening of Spain, which after the death of Philipp II had surpassed its political, economic, and cultural climax - not least as a consequence of the war with the Netherlands.

The terms of the ecclesiastical law of the Empire concluded at the Peace of Westphalia (1648) were the result of a process lasting 130 years in which the emperor and the Empire as well as the popes had participated with various degrees of intensity. Indeed, politics and religion were always closely connected during this time. The process of confessional formation was parallel to the development of the modern territorial states. Gradually, the confessions came to serve the new state authority. For the popes, the most important issue was whether and in which manner they could influence the complex confessional developments in Germany.

Immediately after the unsuccessful Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517) which ended without the necessary reform of the Curia and the life of the Church, Martin Luther began to provoke theological discussions in the Empire. [3] Pope Leo X (Giovanni de Medici, 1513-1521), one of the weakest and most ill-fated popes, was not capable of fulfilling the demanding spiritual duties of his time. Despite the condemnation of the Lutheran teachings by the bull "Exsurge Domine" from June 15, 1520 and the bull of excommunication from January 3, 1521, Leo X and his Curia underestimated the explosive force of the budding reformation for the Roman church. Applying laws against heretics that had been in force since the thirteenth century, the reformer was put under imperial ban by the emperor's Edict of Worms issued on May 8, 1521. However, the execution of the ban was repeatedly delayed and finally suspended. The medieval laws against heretics were no longer suitable to the times.

Emperor Charles V and the estates of the Empire hoped to overcome the theological problems by the convocation of a reform council within the imperial territory. The popes hardly reacted to the suspension of the execution of the ban against Luther, nor did they respond to the increasing number of concessions which the emperor, for political reasons, had granted the Protestants prior to 1544. As a consequence, a "coexistence of two confessions" developed in the Empire - with both confessions asserting the exclusive truth and universal validity of their doctrine (Konrad Repgen). Most of the provisions of the secularly authored ecclesiastical law did not bear up to the theological criticism of either confession. Consequently, both sides called for a temporary state of emergency.

In 1544 in Speyer, the emperor was forced to grant far-reaching concessions in order to gain the support of the Protestant princes against France. For the first time, Charles V conceded to the sovereigns of the evangelical territories the right to carry out a "Christian reformation" of their churches and monasteries. He approved first regulations regarding the parity of church property and the protection of both confessions. Many of these terms later became part of the Religious Peace of Augsburg. Pope Paul III (Alessandro Farnese, 1534-1549) reacted to the establishment of the Lutheran confessional church by imperial law - which was not compatible with Catholic ecclesiastical law - with a sharp admonishing brief to the emperor on August 24, 1544. The peace of Crépy from September 18, 1544 and the pope's planned convocation of the council in the city of Trent for March 15, 1545 prevented the outbreak of the medieval conflict between "sacerdotium" and "imperium" over the emperor's competence to enact fundamental changes to the ecclesiastical law of the Empire without the participation of Rome.

Charles V, who strove for a monarchical reform of the Empire and failed due to the resistance of the territorial princes, was likewise unable to compel the unity of faith within the Empire. After 1552, Charles V handed the German problems on to his brother Ferdinand who aspired for peaceful agreement. After arduous negotiations between Ferdinand and the estates of the Empire at the Diet of Augsburg (which had been in session since February 1555), the Religious Peace of Augsburg was proclaimed imperial law on September 25, 1555. [4] Through the law, a political-secular peace order was established which was to be maintained provisionally until the future restoration of the unity of faith; in actuality however, this peace order endured. The peace of the Empire was to be maintained in spite of the schism in faith; all forms of violence aimed at enforcing confessional goals were forbidden. All sovereigns, including the spiritual rulers, were granted the right to force their subjects to adopt their own confession (ius reformandi). Subjects who refused to adopt the ruler's confession were granted the right to emigrate. The regulations were explicitly valid only for Catholics and the adherents of the Augsburg Confession. All other denominations, including Calvinists, were in principle subject to the medieval laws combating heresy. The jurisdiction of Catholic bishops over the evangelical territories was suspended. Protestants were guaranteed the secularisation of mediate church property commensurate to the status of the holdings in 1552. In regard to the primary question of the ecclesiastical estates of the Empire, Ferdinand and the Catholic party succeeded in instituting a security clause: the conversion of an ecclesiastical prince to the Augsburg Confession would result in the forfeiture of his ministry (Ecclesiastical Reservation). However, the legal obligations of this clause remained heavily disputed. In confessionally mixed cities of the Empire, the confessional status quo was to be maintained. The "Declaratio Ferdinandea", formulated after the Diet, protected a limited form of mixed confessionalism in the ecclesiastical territories. Yet, these provisions of the ecclesiastical law of the Empire did not bring about permanent peace between the confessions. Rather, they consisted of complicated formulaic compromises between different confessional positions and contained ambiguities and omissions that later allowed for a variety of interpretations. The battle over interpretation which was fought with increasing bitterness was finally absorbed into the conflict of the ThirtyYears' War. Nevertheless, the Religious Peace was regarded as fundamental law of the Empire. Even the ecclesiastical law of the Empire promulgated in 1648 (art. V and VII IPO) was considered only as confirmation of and an amendment to the provisions of 1555.

On March 23, 1555, it was Cardinal Otto von Truchse from Augsburg who protested the Religious Peace. (After 1645 the papal peace mediator, the nuncio Fabio Chigi, would follow von Truchse ' example and would protest the provisions pertaining to the ecclesiastical law of the Empire concluded in the Peace of Westphalia.) Before Truchse ' protest, the Roman Curia had been informed of the fundamental incompatibility of the Religious Peace with the Catholic ecclesiastical law in a testimonial by the legate Giovanni Morone. Pope Paul IV (Giampetro Caraffa, 1555-1559) did not, however, feel compelled to endorse a legally binding position on the Religious Peace.

At the Diet of Augsburg in 1566, the Emperor Maximilian II sought the confirmation of the Religious Peace by the estates of the Empire. With their support, he hoped to impose measures against Calvinism which was spreading rapidly throughout the Empire under the leadership of the Palatinate (Catechism of Heidelberg, 1563). The papal legate Giovanni Francesco Commendone, sent to Augsburg by Pius V, had already summoned the Catholic estates of the Empire in order to persuade them in the name of the pope to accept the decrees of the Council of Trent. On May 23, they verbally assented, initiating the renewal of the Catholic church in the Empire. Upon careful consideration and influenced by the Jesuit Petrus Canisius, Commendone had decided to dispense with a protestation against the Religious Peace. His attitude remained authoritative to the Curia and the nuncios at the imperial court until 1641.

The effective implementation of the Tridentine decrees on reform was first and foremost dependent on the renewal of the papacy. Change began with Pius IV (Giovanni Angelo Medici, 1559-1565), who ordered the reconvening of the suspended council for January 18, 1562. With the help of Cardinal Morone, the council was brought to a successful close early in December 1563. The decrees were meant to confirm, record, and define Catholic faith without an explicit confrontation with Protestant theology. The decrees launched the process of modernisation and confessionalisation of the Catholic church - a process which had already been carried out by the Lutherans and the Reformed churches. Sixtus V (Felice Peretti, 1585-1590) completed the reform of the Curia began by Pius IV: Roman centralism and papal absolutism were strengthened, while the College of Cardinals was largely excluded from the reign of the World Church and the government of the Papal States. Following the example of Carlo Borromeo, [5] papal nepotism also changed - it was no longer a means to exercise power, but rather was limited to assuring the maintenance of the Pope's family. [6] In this way, the nepotes of the Aldobrandini, Borghese, Ludovisi and Barberini families succeeded in accumulating immense fortunes during the first half of the seventeenth century. [7]

Besides Pius V, it was above all Gregory XIII (Ugo Boncompagni, 1572-1585) who made a lasting impact on church reform; he expanded and transformed the permanent nunciatures into instruments of Catholic reform and instituted seminars for the training of the clergy in Rome and to the north of the Alps. Like almost no other pope, Gregory XIII strove for a renewal of the Church of the Empire planned and attended by a special congregation (Congregatio Germanica).

The dynamic impetus to reform that marked the period after the council, slackened off considerably after a generation. The cardinals Paleotti and Bellarmin expressed concern about the stagnation of the internal ecclesiastical efforts toward renewal which were lacking momentum and, in many cases, were hampered by the practices of the Curia. [8] In addition, the Church, which was undergoing a revival, was ensnared in gruelling conflicts with Catholic territorial rulers over questions concerning jurisdiction - especially in regard to Spain and its Italian possessions, Milan and Naples, as well as the Republic of Venice. The princes strove for greater influence over the ecclesiastical structures in their territories and made every effort to gain control over the entire church administration and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, while the Church, with renewed self-confidence, emphatically demanded the complete restoration and unhindered exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Some conflicts - like those in Spain - remained unresolved until the nineteenth century. [9]

Towards the end of the pontificate of Paul V (Camillo Borghese, 1605-1621), political, confessional, and military conflicts broke out in Northern Italy. These conflicts soon became part of the Thirty Years' War and led to a confrontation - like that at the end of the fifteenth century - between the House of Habsburg and France. Through various means, the popes attempted to preserve their independence and to maintain peace in Italy. Soon after the Double Peace of Paris (September 6, 1617) - a result of both papal and French mediation - which ended both the war between Savoy and Milan over the County of Montferrat (a possession of Mantua) as well as the armed conflict caused by the Uskok piracy between Venice and Inner Austria, the situation in Northern Italy came to a head again. Indeed, the tension between the reformed Grisons and the Catholic Valtelline which had long been smouldering, finally erupted: [10] after the Grisons encroachment, inhabitants of the Valtelline rose in arms and, following an agreement with the Spanish governor of Milan, murdered over four hundred Protestants in the "Sacro Macello" (July 19, 1620). Soon thereafter, Spanish troops marched into the Valtelline and erected a number of fortifications; approaching from the Tyrol, the Archduke Leopold simultaneously occupied the Münster valley. As a result, Spain now had a secure land-bridge from Milan to the Netherlands that could transport soldiers and equipment. This was contrary to the interests of France and Venice who had secured the right to this corridor in earlier treaties with Grisons. Early in 1621, France and Spain agreed on meeting in Madrid for negotiations in order to resolve the problem.

The new pope Gregory XV (Alessandro Ludovisi, 1621 - July 8, 1623) [11], who had been elected with the support of France on February 9, 1621, was immediately aware of the explosiveness of the situation. He emphatically demanded that Spain observe the peace in Italy, and he also called for the quick settlement of the Valtelline question. On April 25, 1621, a treaty was signed in Madrid in which the French demand for restoration of the status quo ante was fulfilled. The settlement of the religious problems in accordance with the January 1, 1617 status was to follow. Nevertheless, the Lucerne negotiations regarding the execution of the settlements failed - mainly because the pope rejected the religious article that had been formulated without the participation of Rome, but also because he demanded the exclusive admission of the Catholic confession in the Valtelline. The Spanish and French, however, were not willing to modify the treaty. It was France and Venice, above all, who insisted on the immediate and unconditional execution of the treaty. After further acts of war in the Valtelline, a number of fictitious treaties, and Spain's delay tactics, the French found themselves forced to enter into an offensive coalition with Savoy and Venice (February 7, 1623) in order to militarily enforce the observance of the Madrid treaty. At this point, Gregory XV opted for a risky enterprise: stressing his neutrality as "Padre comune", he sent papal troops - in the name of maintaining peace between the Catholic powers - to occupy the fortifications in the Valtelline. Meanwhile, the conflict was to be settled at a conference of ambassadors in Rome. The negotiations had barely begun, however, when Gregory XV died.

The bold politics of Gregory XV involved risks that his successor, Urban VIII (Maffeo Barberini, 1623-1644), [12] was not prepared for. The Roman negotiations were unsuccessful as a consequence of the politics of mutual obstruction pursued by both France and Spain as well as the pope's refusal to take the initiative. The situation changed in August 1624 when Cardinal Richelieu entered the French government. The offensive coalition was revived and in the winter of 1624/25, the Valtelline was conquered by the Marquis de Coeuvres - with no resistance by the papal troops. Urban VIII was certainly embittered by the French action but he continued to emphasise his neutrality. The legation (1625) of his nepote Francesco Barberini to France and Spain also had no results. In secret negotiations that took place without the pope, France and Spain came to an agreement on the Valtelline and signed the Treaty of Monzón, antedated March 5, 1626. The religious question was settled in compliance with Gregory XV's demands.

The Ludovisi pope and his collaborators regarded the Thirty Years' War above all as a religious war: "Imperoché egli non può negarsi essere questa [guerra] una causa di Dio, un sostegno della religione cattolica, ma insieme una necessaria difesa delle cose sacre et profane et delle vite degli stati e dell'Imperio medesimo." [13] Like few popes before, Gregory XV, founder of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, pursued an active and well thought-out policy towards the emperor and the Empire. [14]

He intended to utilise the advantageous course of the Bohemian-Palatine war following the imperial ban on Frederick Elector Palatine for the expansion of Catholicism, the securing of a Catholic Empire, the restoration of papal authority, and the recovery of church wealth seized earlier by the Protestants. In order to achieve these goals, it was important to obtain a Catholic majority in the electoral college by transferring the electoral dignity of the Palatinate to Bavaria. For this purpose, the pope supported the emperor and the Catholic League through considerable financial means and launched an active (and secretive) diplomacy at the imperial court and in Spain. The pope continued to reject both truce negotiations and the restitution of the Palatine as long as his goals were unmet. With Frederick's defeat, Calvinism in Germany could also be vanquished. At the end of his pontificate - after the conquest of the Palatinate and the transfer of the electorate to the Duke of Bavaria - Gregory XV approved the truce concluded at Brussels and assented to a peace conference which was to have taken place in Frankfurt or Cologne. Realistically assessing the military and political possibilities, he directed his efforts at preserving what had already been achieved.

Urban VIII assumed a much more reserved attitude toward the emperor and the Empire than his predecessor. After some time, he ceased subsidising the Catholic troops. The victories of the Catholic armies led by Wallenstein and Tilly allowed for the imperial Edict of Restitution issued on March 6, 1629. In this edict, Ferdinand II, by virtue of his imperial authority, attempted to determine the most controversial legal positions of the Religious Peace of Augsburg - legal positions that had never been accepted by the Protestants. He ordered the restitution of all church property which had been alienated after 1552 from the Catholics, confirmed the validity of the Ecclesiastical Reservation as effective and binding imperial law, declared the "Declaratio Ferdinandea" as null and void, confirmed the unrestricted "ius reformandi" of the Catholic estates of the Empire, and excluded the Reformed churches from the Religious Peace. [15]

With these terms, the emperor interfered extensively in the political and ecclesiastical structures of the Protestant territories. The resistance of all evangelical estates was to be expected. In the end, military intervention by Sweden in 1631/32 made the Edict of Restitution ineffective. Despite the advantages for the Catholic party, Rome did not actively support or advocate the edict. On the contrary, the edict was rejected because it was based on the Religious Peace of 1555 which had never been recognised by the popes. However, the actual reasons for the rejection and lack of papal support for the Catholic cause in Germany can be found in Italy. During the war of succession in Mantua (1627-1631), the antagonism between the Bourbons and the House of Habsburg overtly erupted and led to a momentous political-military co-operation between the Austrian and Spanish lineages of Habsburg in Italy.

After the extinction of the Gonzaga, the main lineage in Mantua who were traditionally pro-Habsburg, it was Charles Gonzague, Duke of Nevers and member of France's high nobility, who was the first in line to claim succession. He immediately appropriated the Imperial fief of Mantua. While he was supported as successor by France, Spain rejected him. The Emperor, as supreme liege lord, was to make the decision. When Richelieu and Louis XIII, leading a strong force of troops in 1629/30, entered Northern Italy, Ferdinand II felt forced - against the will of Bavaria - to intervene. In the summer of 1630, the imperial army conquered and destroyed the city and the fortifications of Mantua. A settlement was only made in 1631: when alarmed by Gustavus Adolphus' offensive in Germany, the Peace of Cherasco was concluded. Nevers was invested with the fief of Mantua but lost a part of Montferrat to Savoy. Thus, France was able to improve its strategic position in Italy.

Pope Urban VIII had supported Nevers in order to strengthen France's influence and loosen Spain's grasp of the Papal States. While efforts were made towards conciliation and peace, the pope retreated and adopted a passive role as "Padre comune". He proposed no solutions for the conflict and declined both the role of a neutral arbitrator between the parties as well as that of a guarantor of the peace. He prioritised the problems of political imbalance in Italy and the weakening of the House of Habsburg as far more important than actively supporting the recovery of Germany for a Catholicism contingent on the emperor. The call to fight against heretics and heresies in the Empire was merely rhetorical with no concrete consequences. Urban VIII's interest was concentrated almost exclusively on the Papal States (the annexation of Urbino) and the Barberini family. This became most evident at the end of his pontificate during the Castro war.

Urban VIII's passivity was precisely that which strengthened France's position. De facto, France was given full liberty. On the initiative of the papal nuncio in Paris, Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno, a secret Bavarian-French alliance was concluded in the spring of 1631. [16] It was hoped that through this alliance Bavaria might turn away from the emperor, thereby neutralising the troops of the League. Rome accepted the offensive alliance between France and Sweden in January 1631, just as it had tolerated the French-English peace in April 1629 and France's support of the States-General against Spain. In 1632, when Sweden had almost all of Southern Germany under its control and the collapse of the imperial Catholic front in the Empire seemed eminent, the pope was confronted with embittered protests and accusations by the Spanish. In the end, Urban VIII reacted by granting the emperor and Bavaria a rather modest amount of financial assistance. Of course, when France officially entered the war in 1635, this financial support was withheld.

In the autumn of 1634, the tides turned to the advantage of the emperor: imperial and Spanish troops defeated Sweden at Nördlingen (September 6, 1634). On May 30, 1635, after prolonged negotiations, the Peace of Prague was concluded between Emperor (as head of the Catholic party) and Electoral Saxony (as leader of the Protestants). [17] As a general peace, the Peace of Prague was to resolve all political and ecclesiastical controversies in the Empire (the temporary suspension of the Edict of Restitution, the establishment of 1627 as the standard year, the validity of Ecclesiastical Reservation, and the exclusion of the Calvinists). Once again, the legal basis of the Peace of Prague was the religious settlement of 1555. However, the emperor was above all interested in a constitutional extension of his power, and like Charles V, in the consequent assertion of the monarchical principle against the territorial rulers (repeal of the right of the estates to form alliances, subordination of the troops to supreme imperial command). Urban VIII reacted to the Peace of Prague in a brief to the emperor dated July 22, 1635. In his brief, he left all fundamental issues undecided, did not broach the validity of the ecclesiastical law of the Empire, and praised the emperor for his efforts. [18] Nevertheless, the Peace of Prague was hardly effective since France entered the war on May 19, 1635 after forming an alliance with the Netherlands. Hence, a peace settlement within the Empire had become impossible. Now, only a general European peace congress could end the war.

At first, Rome was dismayed by France's entrance into the war as they realised that a speedy peace between the Catholic powers was now out of reach. Relying on his negotiators in Paris, Madrid and Vienna, the pope attempted to obtain consent for a peace congress which would take place in Cologne. As early as August 1635, Rome appointed Cardinal Marzio Ginetti as the peace legate. Early in 1636, he was sent incognito to the Rhine city where he waited in vain for four years for the peace congress to convene. Ginetti had been instructed to maintain the position of a neutral peace mediator. Urban VIII, pursuing his policy with consistency, did not grant Ginetti the most important power of a mediator - the authority to suggest his own proposals in order to resolve controversial issues. Likewise, he was not empowered to negotiate with the Protestants. [19]

Through the initiative of Bavaria and Saxony, an Electoral Diet took place early in 1640 in Nuremberg. On this occasion, Brandenburg and Saxony proposed a modification of the Peace of Prague. Especially in questions regarding the extension of amnesty and the freedom of worship, they wanted to go beyond the terms concluded at Prague. After the negotiations had reached an impasse, the Emperor Ferdinand III convoked - in spite of opposition by the electors - the Imperial Diet which had not convened since 1613; the diet was in session from September 13, 1640 until October 10, 1641. The emperor had succeeded in excluding the radical opponents: the Electoral Palatinate, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg. It was, however, the reformed Elector Brandenburg who now openly declared himself a committed opponent of the emperor's policy as expressed in the Edict of Restitution and in the Peace of Prague. On April 18, 1641, even before the conclusion of the deliberations, a written and notarised protestation was forwarded to the emperor by Gasparo Mattei, the nuncio at the imperial court. The protest was directed against a general amnesty in the Empire, the standard year of 1627 for the restitution of church properties, and the gravamina of the evangelical estates. "A documentary legal action [...] was set up with every bureaucratic formality: therefore, in a positive legal sense, a new period in the relationship between papacy and Empire began on April 18, 1641." [20] The emperor and his advisers did not react and therefore, the protest had no consequences. However, with the nuncio's hasty protestation, the Roman position was defined for the future: a flexible reaction as in the past was no longer possible. [21] Mattei's action was just as impolitic as it was misguided. At first, Mattei was fixated on a protest, but later he did not even notice that at the recess of the Imperial Diet in October 1641, the Religious Peace of Augsburg was positively confirmed - without his protest - for the first time since 1566. [22]

The protestations [23] forwarded in 1648 by the nuncio Fabio Chigi [24], papal peace mediator at the Westphalian Peace Congress, against the terms of the ecclesiastical law of the Empire which were included in the Treaty of Osnabrück [25] were not based on Mattei's earlier protest. On November 25, 1647, when the settlement of the ecclesiastical issues in Osnabrück was at hand, Chigi directed an admonishing letter to the emperor, the imperial delegates, and all Catholic estates in which he demanded that they should not consent to anything which might be in contradiction to the resolutions of the ecumenical councils and the ecclesiastical orders; otherwise, a protest would be inevitable. On December 24, Chigi took the next step: he gave notice of a secret brief (dated October 1644), which he had received in May 1646, to the Catholic estates. With this brief, the nuncio had been authorised to lodge public protestations. He had come to the decision to protest in October 1645, following the model of Cardinal Truchse ' protest of the Religious Peace of Augsburg. [26] Chigi was provided with the document by the bishop of Augsburg, Waldemar von Knöringen.

On October 14 and 26, 1648, the nuncio Chigi publicly distanced himself from the agreements concerning the policies on religion. He had notarised declarations of protest formally delivered to the leading Catholic powers represented at the congress. He thereby assumed the position of the Catholic "maximalists" at the peace congress, who joined the bishop of Osnabrück, Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg. [27] In September 1649, the Catholic estates of the Empire were sent a circular letter and certified copies of Chigi's protest from October 26, 1648.

On August 20, 1650, immediately after the close of the Nuremberg negotiations on the execution of the settlement, Pope Innocent X (Giovanni Battista Pamfili, 1644-1655) had the brief "Zelo domus Dei", which was backdated to November 26, 1648, sent to the nuncios for publication. In this brief, he objected to the provisions concerning the legal terms regarding religion which had been included in the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. He declared them as incompatible with the norms of Catholic ecclesiastical law and, therefore, null and void. [28] The papal brief surpassed Chigi's protestations; it "expressed sharp opposition" to the newly agreed-upon religious constitution of the German Empire. [29] However, the papal protest was hardly effective because anti-protest clauses (art. XVII ? 3.4 IPO and ? 101 IPM), which formed substantial parts of the peace treaties, guaranteed against eventual protests or reservations. [30]

Chigi's protestations and the papal brief "Zelo domus Dei" determined Rome's future attitude against positions incompatible with ecclesiastical law. Rome's protestations to international agreements and treaties from 1648 until the disintegration of the Papal States, testify to the papacy's growing isolation and political impotence.

FOOTNOTES